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GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article grapples with the complexities of law in a world of hybrid 
legal spaces, where a single act or actor is potentially regulated by 
multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes. In order to conceptualize this world, 
I introduce literature on legal pluralism, and I suggest that, following its 
insights, we need to realize that normative conflict among multiple, 
overlapping legal systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be 
desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse 
among multiple community affiliations. Thus, instead of trying to stifle 
conflict either through an imposition of sovereigntist, territorially-based 
prerogative or through universalist harmonization schemes, communities 
might sometimes seek (and increasingly are creating) a wide variety of 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing, without 
eliminating, hybridity. Such mechanisms, institutions, and practices can 
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help mediate conflicts by recognizing that multiple communities may 
legitimately wish to assert their norms over a given act or actor, by seeking 
ways of reconciling competing norms, and by deferring to other 
approaches if possible. Moreover, when deference is impossible (because 
some instances of legal pluralism are repressive, violent, and/or profoundly 
illiberal), procedures for managing hybridity can at least require an 
explanation of why a decision maker cannot defer. In sum, pluralism offers 
not only a more comprehensive descriptive account of the world we live in, 
but also suggests a potentially useful alternative approach to the design of 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I summarize the literature 
on legal pluralism and suggest ways in which this literature helps us 
understand the global legal environment. Second, drawing on pluralist 
insights, I offer an analytical framework for addressing normative 
conflicts, one that provides an alternative both to territorially-based 
sovereigntism and to universalism, and instead opens space for the 
“jurisgenerative” interplay of multiple normative communities and 
commitments. This framework generates a series of values and principles 
that can be used to evaluate the efficacy of procedural mechanisms, 
institutional designs, and discursive practices for managing hybridity. 
Third, I survey a series of such mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
already in use in a wide variety of doctrinal contexts, and I discuss how 
they work (or sometimes fail to work) in actual practice. And though each 
of these mechanisms, institutions, and practices has been discussed 
individually in the scholarly literature, they have not generally been 
considered together through a pluralist lens, nor have they been evaluated 
based on their ability to manage and preserve hybridity. Thus, my analysis 
offers a significantly different approach, one that injects a distinct set of 
concerns into debates about global legal interactions. Indeed, although 
many of these mechanisms, institutions, and practices are often viewed as 
“second-best” accommodations between hard-line sovereigntist and 
universalist positions, I argue that they might at least sometimes be 
preferable to either. In the Conclusion, I suggest implications of this 
approach for more general thinking about the potential role of law in 
identifying and negotiating social and cultural difference. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We inhabit a world of multiple normative communities.1 Some of 
those communities impose their norms through officially sanctioned 
coercive force and formal legal processes. These are the nation-state 
governments and courts familiar to legal scholars. But of course many 
other normative communities articulate norms without formal state power 
behind them. Indeed, legal pluralists have long noted that law does not 
reside solely in the coercive commands of a sovereign power.2 Rather, law 
 
 1. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (“We inhabit a nomos—a 
normative universe.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 11, 15 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) [hereinafter Moore, Legal Systems of the 
World] (“[N]ot all the phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their source in 
government.”). For further discussions of legal pluralism, see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, 
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is constantly constructed through the contest of these various norm-
generating communities.3 Thus, although “official” norms articulated by 
sovereign entities obviously count as “law,” such official assertions of 
prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction are only some of the many ways in 
which normative commitments arise. 
Moreover, legal pluralists have sought to document hybrid legal 
spaces, where more than one legal, or quasi-legal, regime occupies the 
same social field.4 Historically, such sites were most prominently 
associated either with colonialism—where the legal system imposed by 
empire was layered on top of indigenous legal systems5—or the study of 
religion—where canon law and other spiritual codes have often existed in 
an uneasy relationship with the state legal system.6 Legal pluralists 
 
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2d ed. 2002); 
LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005); CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF 
PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 
Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in BEGEGNUNG UND KONFLIKT: EINE 
KULTURANTHROPOLOGISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME 33 (2001); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1997); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 37 (2002); David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives 
on a Civil Trial Court, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425 (1980); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: 
Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 28–34 (1981); John 
Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle 
Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 
STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Merry, Spatial Legal Pluralism]; Sally 
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988) [hereinafter Merry, Legal 
Pluralism]; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973) [hereinafter Moore, The Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and 
Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345 
(2005); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296 (2000).  
 3. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 43 (“The position that only the state 
creates law . . . confuses the status of interpretation with the status of political domination.”). See also 
Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: 
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 176 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter Cover, Folktales of Justice] (arguing that “all collective behavior entailing systematic 
understandings of our commitments to future worlds” can lay “equal claim to the word ‘law’”) 
(emphasis added); Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 963–
64 (1991) (“This Article belongs to a body of legal scholarship that refuses to limit the domain of law to 
the law of the state.”). 
 4. See Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social Field, supra note 2, at 720. 
 5. See, e.g., Leopold Pospisil, Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in New 
Guinea, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 93 (1981). 
 6. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980) [hereinafter WEISBROD, 
UTOPIA] (examining the contractual underpinnings of four nineteenth-century American religious 
utopian communities: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar). As Marc Galanter has 
observed, the field of church and state is the “locus classicus of thinking about the multiplicity of 
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explored the myriad ways that overlapping legal systems interact with each 
other and observed that the very existence of multiple systems can at times 
create openings for contestation, resistance, and creative adaptation.7 
In this Article, I apply a pluralist framework to the global arena and 
argue that this framework is essential if we are to more comprehensively 
conceptualize a world of hybrid legal spaces. International law scholars 
have not often paid attention to the pluralist literature, nor have they 
generally conceived of their field in terms of managing hybridity. Instead, 
the principal emphasis has been on formal state-to-state relations, the 
creation of overarching universal norms, or the resolution of disputes by 
locating them territorially in order to choose a single governing law to 
apply.8 All of these approaches attempt to eliminate hybridity altogether by 
imagining that disputes can and should be made susceptible to a single 
governing normative authority. Yet, it is now clear that the global legal 
system is an interlocking web of jurisdictional assertions by state, 
international, and non-state normative communities.9 And each type of 
overlapping jurisdictional assertion (state versus state; state versus 
international body; state versus non-state entity) creates a potentially hybrid 
legal space that is not easily eliminated.10 
With regard to state versus state conflicts, the growth of global 
communications technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities 
with no significant territorial center of gravity, and the mobility of capital 
and people across borders mean that many jurisdictions will feel effects of 
activities around the globe, leading inevitably to multiple assertions of legal 
authority over the same act, without regard to territorial location. For 
 
normative orders.” Galanter, supra note 2, at 28. See also Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: 
An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1988) (analyzing church-
state relations in the United States from a pluralist perspective). 
 7. See, e.g., Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 878 (noting room for resistance and 
autonomy within plural systems). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 82–83. 
 9. As one commenter puts it: 
The nation-state and the interstate system are the central political forms of the capitalist world 
system, and they will probably remain so for the foreseeable future. What has happened, 
however, is that they have become an inherently contested terrain, and this is the central new 
fact on which the analysis must focus: the state and the interstate system as complex social 
fields in which state and non-state, local and global social relations interact, merge and 
conflict in dynamic and even volatile combinations. 
SANTOS, supra note 2, at 94. 
 10. In that sense, we might more accurately refer to the “global legal system” as a “multiscalar 
legal system.” See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 187 n.19 (2007) (arguing that the term “multiscalar” more accurately captures the 
variety of normative communities with input at different “levels” of the legal hierarchy than does the 
word “global”). 
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example, a French court asserted jurisdiction over U.S.-based Internet 
service provider Yahoo! because French users could download Nazi 
memorabilia and Holocaust denial material via Yahoo!’s auction sites, in 
violation of French law.11 Yahoo! argued in response that the French 
assertion of jurisdiction was impermissibly extraterritorial in scope because 
Yahoo!, as a U.S. corporation transmitting material uploaded in the United 
States, was protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.12 
Yet, the extraterritoriality charge runs in both directions. If France is not 
able to block the access of French citizens to proscribed material, then the 
United States will effectively be imposing First Amendment norms on the 
entire world. And whatever the solution to this problem might be, a 
territorial analysis will not help because the relevant transaction is both 
“in” France and not “in” France simultaneously. Cross-border 
environmental,13 trade,14 intellectual property,15 and tax regulation16 raise 
similar issues. 
Multiple states asserting jurisdiction over the same activity is just the 
tip of the iceberg, however, because nation-states must also often share 
legal authority with one or more international and regional courts, 
tribunals, or regulatory entities. Indeed, the Project on International Courts 
and Tribunals has identified approximately 125 international institutions, 
all issuing decisions that have some effect on state legal authority,17 though 
those decisions are sometimes deemed binding, sometimes merely 
persuasive, and often fall somewhere between the two. For example, under 
 
 11. Tribunal de Grande Instance De Paris [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, Ordonnance de refere, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, available at http:// 
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see 
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 337–42, 516–20 (2002) 
[hereinafter Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction]. 
 12.  Tribunal de Grande Instance De Paris [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, Ordonnance de refere, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, available at http:// 
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm.  
 13. See, e.g., TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006); Philippe Sands, Turtles 
and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527 (2001). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global 
Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
 15. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 
(4th Cir. 2003); GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000). 
 16. See, e.g., Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 334–37. 
 17. See PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE INT’L JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT (2004), 
available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/Synop_C4.pdf. 
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the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and other similar 
agreements, special panels can pass judgment on whether domestic legal 
proceedings have provided fair process.18 And though the panels cannot 
directly review or overturn local judgments, they can levy fines against the 
federal government signatories of the agreement, thereby undermining the 
impact of the local judgment.19 Thus, now that a NAFTA tribunal has ruled 
that a particular decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court violated norms 
of due process,20 it is an open question as to what legal rule will govern 
future cases in Mississippi raising similar issues.21 Meanwhile, in the realm 
of human rights, we have seen criminal defendants convicted in state courts 
in the United States proceed (through their governments) to the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to argue that they were denied the 
right to contact their consulate, as required by treaty.22 Again, although the 
ICJ judgments are technically unenforceable in the United States, at least 
one state court followed the ICJ’s command anyway.23 
Finally, non-state legal (or quasi-legal) norms add to the hybridity. 
Given increased migration and global communication, it is not surprising 
that people feel ties to, and act based on affiliations with, multiple 
communities in addition to their territorial ones. Such communities may be 
ethnic, religious, or epistemic, transnational, subnational, or international, 
and the norms asserted by such communities frequently challenge 
territorially-based authority. Indeed, as noted previously, canon law and 
other religious community norms have long operated in significant overlap 
with state law. And in the Middle East and elsewhere, conflicts between a 
personal law tied to religion and a territorial law tied to the nation-state 
continue to pose constitutional and other challenges.24 Bonds of ethnicity 
can also create significant normative communities. For example, some 
commentators advocate regimes that give ethnic minorities limited 
 
 18. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1135, Jan. 1, 1994, 107 
Stat. 2057.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3. Publicly 
released documents on all NAFTA disputes are available online at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited 
Sep. 1, 2007). 
 21. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004) (discussing case). 
 22. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 
(2004). 
 23. See Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 
2004) (granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing). 
 24. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 13, 47–55 (2006). 
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autonomy within larger nation-states.25 And transnationally, when 
members of an ethnic diaspora purchase securities issued by their “home” 
country, one might argue that, regardless of where, territorially, the bonds 
are purchased, the transactions should be governed by the law of the 
“homeland.”26 Finally, we see communities of transnational bankers 
developing their own law governing trade finance27 and the use of modern 
forms of lex mercatoria28 to govern business relations.29 Such non-state 
legal systems often influence (or are incorporated into) state or 
international regimes.30 
These spheres of complex overlapping legal authority are, not 
surprisingly, sites of conflict and confusion. In response to this hybrid 
reality, communities might seek to “solve” such conflicts either by 
reimposing the primacy of territorially-based (and often nation-state-based) 
authority or by seeking universal harmonization.31 Thus, on the one hand, 
 
 25. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy 
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1541–42 (1991) (identifying three different 
types of autonomy regimes for ethnic minorities). 
 26. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1060–74 (2001) (describing 
debt instruments offered by the Indian government to raise capital principally from its diaspora). 
 27. See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005). 
 28. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and 
International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 159 (2004) (noting that the Convention 
“explicitly incorporates trade usages into contracts that it governs, permits usages to trump conflicting 
[Convention] provisions, and authorizes courts to interpret and complete contracts by reference to 
usages”). But see Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria—Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 67 (2004) (arguing that the modern revival of lex mercatoria departs significantly from the 
historical conception). 
 29. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private 
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2004) (using game theory to argue that the existence of 
pre-existing networks enhances a private legal system’s ability to enforce norms); Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the system of “private lawmaking” in the New York Diamond 
Dealers Club); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (describing the non-state legal 
system used to govern commercial transactions in the cotton industry); Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna 
Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006) (discussing a 
“Tuna Court” in Japan that adjudicates disputes about sale prices in a tuna market). 
 30. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 27, at 165 (describing ways in which formal lawmaking 
institutions such as the World Trade Organization have, over time, appropriated non-state trade finance 
norms into their official legal instruments). See generally Carol Weisbrod, Fusion Folk: A Comment on 
Law and Music, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1439 (1999) (using the incorporation of folk music into “high 
culture” classical compositions as a metaphor for understanding the relationship between state and non-
state law). 
 31. One could, of course, also attempt to impose a single, nonterritorial authority. See, e.g., Ga. 
High Sch. Ass’n v. Waddell, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981) (holding that a dispute over a referee’s decision 
affecting the outcome of a high school football game was nonjusticiable). But see PGA Tour, Inc. v. 
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communities may try to seal themselves off from outside influence, either 
by retreating from the rest of the world and becoming more insular (as 
some religious groups seek to do32), by building walls both literal33 or 
regulatory34 to protect the community from outsiders, by taking measures 
to limit outside influence (proposed U.S. legislation seeking to discipline 
judges for citing foreign or international law is but one prominent 
example35) or by imposing territorially-based jurisdictional or choice-of-
law rules.36 At the other extreme, we see calls for harmonization of 
norms,37 more treaties,38 the construction of international governing 
bodies,39 and the creation of “world law.”40 
 
Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (ruling that a golf association had violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act by preventing a partially disabled golfer from using a golf cart to compete); Bart 
Aronson, Pinstripes and Jailhouse Stripes: The Case of “Athlete’s Immunity,” FINDLAW.COM, Nov. 3, 
2000, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/aronson/20001103.html (criticizing the blanket refusal to 
apply criminal law sanctions to athletes’ actions during sporting events). For further discussion of the 
“folk law of games or sports,” see J. Griffiths, Introduction, in PEOPLE’S LAW AND STATE LAW: THE 
BELLAGIO PAPERS 13, 18 (Antony Allott & Gordon R. Woodman eds., 1985) (quoting Gordon R. 
Woodman). 
 32. See, e.g., WEISBROD, UTOPIA, supra note 6 (discussing such communities). 
 33. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (authorizing the 
creation of a 700-mile-long, 15-foot-high fence along the U.S.-Mexico border); Gwynne Dyer, World 
Full of Mined and Monitored Walls, GUELPH MERCURY (Ontario), Feb. 10, 2007, at A11, available at 
2007 WLNR 2679139 (discussing border fences being built in Israel, Thailand, India, Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) (Westlaw NewsRoom). 
 34. See, e.g., Ben Elgin & Bruce Einhorn, The Great Firewall of China, BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2006, at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2006/tc20060112_4340 
51.htm (describing China’s efforts to control Internet content entering the country). 
 35. See, e.g., Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 
51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2005) (criticizing a territorialist approach). 
 37. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading 
Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 9, 32–34 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 
1996) (outlining how concerns about a regulatory “race to the bottom” leads to calls for international 
harmonization of regulatory standards). 
 38. See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for 
Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883 (2005) (calling for international harmonization 
of online consumer protection laws through the vehicle of a United Nations convention). 
 39. For an example of such thinking, consider this statement by Markus Kummer, Executive 
Coordinator, Secretariat of the United Nations Working Group on Internet Governance: 
Governments now feel that the Internet has become so important that it should be regarded as 
a matter of national interest. And so they see the need for getting involved. . . . The 
governments who want to play a more active role also see a need for closer international 
cooperation. They feel that the United Nations is the natural system of global governance and 
they hold the view that a UN umbrella would be a prerequisite to give the necessary political 
legitimacy to Internet governance. 
Interview with Markus Kummer, Executive Coordinator, Secretariat of the United Nations Working 
Group on Internet Governance (July 30, 2004), available at http://www.circleid.com/posts/interview_ 
with_united_nations_head_secretariat_of_wgig/. 
 40. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, World Law: An Ecumenical Jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit 5 
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I argue that both sovereigntist territorialism and universalist 
harmonization will at least sometimes offer normatively unattractive 
options and will, in any event, only succeed partially, if at all. These are 
not, however, the only two approaches available for responding to 
hybridity. In addition, following the descriptive insights of legal pluralism, 
we might draw a normative lesson and deliberately seek to create or 
preserve spaces for conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems. 
Indeed, developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
along pluralist lines may sometimes be a useful strategy for managing, 
without eliminating, hybridity.41 Such mechanisms, institutions, and 
practices can help mediate conflicts by recognizing that multiple 
communities may legitimately wish to assert their norms over a given act 
or actor, by seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and by deferring 
to alternative approaches if possible. And even when deference is 
impossible (because some instances of legal pluralism are repressive, 
violent, and/or profoundly illiberal42), procedures for managing hybridity 
can at least require an explanation of why a decision maker refuses to 
defer. 
The excruciatingly difficult case-by-case questions concerning how 
much to defer and how much to impose are probably impossible to answer 
definitively and are, at any rate, beyond the scope of this Article. The 
crucial antecedent point, however, is that although people may never reach 
agreement on norms, they may at least acquiesce in procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, or practices that take hybridity seriously, rather 
than ignoring it through assertions of territorially-based power or 
dissolving it through universalist imperatives. Processes for managing 
 
(Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-4, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=666143 (“[I]t is obvious that there cannot be a world community 
without a body of world law to maintain both order and justice among its different constituents.”). See 
generally Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617 (1995) [hereinafter Berman, 
World Law]. 
 41. Throughout this Article, I refer to mechanisms, institutions, and practices. By mechanisms, I 
mean doctrinal or procedural elements that seek to manage hybridity, such as margins of appreciation or 
mutual recognition regimes. By institutions, I refer to an entire legal or regulatory body, such as a 
hybrid court, that is designed in part to respond to pluralism concerns. And by practices, I mean 
discursive patterns, professional roles, or shared customs that tend to provide a common language or 
social space for disparate groups, even ones that disagree with each other. For example, arguably the 
practice of constitutional adjudication unites even those in the United States who radically disagree 
about the scope of abortion rights. 
 42. See, e.g., SANTOS, supra note 2, at 89 (“To my mind, there is nothing inherently good, 
progressive, or emancipatory about ‘legal pluralism.’ Indeed, there are instances of legal pluralism that 
are quite reactionary. Suffice it to mention here the . . . legal orders established by armed groups—e.g., 
paramilitary forces in connivance with repressive states—in the territories under their control.”). 
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hybridity seek to preserve the spaces of opportunity for contestation and 
local variation that legal pluralists have long documented, and therefore a 
focus on hybridity may at times be both normatively preferable and more 
practical precisely because agreement on substantive norms is so difficult. 
And again, the claim is only that the independent values of pluralism 
should always be factored into the analysis, not that they should never be 
trumped by other considerations. 
This approach, I realize, is unlikely to be fully satisfying either to 
committed nation-state sovereigntists or committed universalists. 
Sovereigntists will object to the idea that nation-states should ever take into 
account international, transnational, or non-state norms.43 Universalists, for 
their part, will chafe at the idea that international norms should ever be 
subordinated to local practices that may be less liberal or less rights-
protecting. And even hard-line pluralists will complain that a view focusing 
on how official actors respond to hybridity is overly state-centric. All I can 
say to such objections is that if a perspective displeases everyone to some 
extent, it is, for that very reason, also likely to be a perspective that 
manages hybridity in the only way possible: by forging provisional 
compromises that fully satisfy no one but may at least generate grudging 
acquiescence. And, in a world of multiple norms, such provisional 
compromises may ultimately be the best we can do. In any event, the 
central argument of this Article is that hybridity is a reality we cannot 
escape, and a pure sovereigntist or universalist position will often be 
unsustainable as a practical matter. Thus, pluralism offers both a more 
accurate descriptive account of the world we live in and a potentially useful 
alternative approach to the design of procedural mechanisms and 
institutions. 
Of course, one thing that a pluralist approach will not do is provide an 
authoritative metric for determining which norms should prevail in this 
messy hybrid world. Nor does it answer the question of who gets to decide. 
Indeed, pluralism fundamentally challenges both positivist and natural 
rights-based assumptions that there can ever be a single answer to such 
questions. For example, as pluralists have documented in the colonial 
context, the state’s efforts to squelch a non-state community are likely only 
to be partial,44 and so the state’s assertion of its own trumping authority is 
 
 43. In part, this objection is grounded in concerns about loss of democratic accountability and 
legitimacy. I address some of these concerns in Part III.A infra. 
 44. See, e.g., Lauren Benton, Making Order Out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the 
Spanish Colonial Borderlands, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 373, 375–76 (2001) (describing jurisdictional 
politics in seventeenth-century New Mexico and observing that, while “the crown made aggressive 
BERM13 10/1/2007 10:11:21 AM 
1166 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1155 
not the end of the debate, but only one gambit in an ongoing normative 
discourse that has no final resolution. Likewise, there is no external 
position from which one could make a definitive statement as to who is 
authorized to make decisions in any given case. Rather, a statement of 
authority is itself inevitably open to contest. Power disparities matter, of 
course, and those who wield coercive force may be able to silence 
competing voices for a time. But even that sort of temporary silencing is 
rarely the end of the story either. Thus, instead of the unitary answers 
assumed by both universalism and sovereigntism, pluralism provides a 
“jurisgenerative” model45 that focuses on the creative interventions made 
by various normative communities drawing on a variety of normative 
sources in ongoing political, rhetorical, and legal iterations.46 
Certainly individual communities may decide that their norms should 
trump those of others or that their norms are authoritative. So, for example, 
a liberal democratic state might decide that certain illiberal community 
practices are so beyond the pale that they cannot be countenanced and 
therefore the state may invoke its authority to stifle those practices. But a 
pluralist approach recognizes that such statements of normative 
commitment and authority are themselves subject to dispute. Accordingly, 
instead of clinging to the vain hope that unitary claims to authoritative law 
can ever be definitive, pluralism recognizes the inevitability (if not always 
the desirability) of hybridity. Pluralism is thus principally a descriptive, not 
a normative, framework. It observes that various actors pursue norms and it 
studies the interplay, but it does not propose a hierarchy of substantive 
norms and values. 
Nevertheless, while it does not offer substantive norms, a pluralist 
approach may favor procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that 
provide opportunities for plural voices. Such procedures can potentially 
help to channel (or even tame) normative conflict to some degree by 
bringing multiple actors together into a shared social space. This 
commitment can, of course, have strong normative implications because it 
asks decision makers and institutional designers to at least consider the 
 
claims that royal authority and state law superseded other legal authorities,” in reality “[j]urisdictional 
disputes became not just commonplace but a defining feature of the legal order”). 
 45. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 11–15. 
 46. Cf. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 49 (2006) (“Whereas natural right 
philosophies assume that the principles that undergird democratic politics are impervious to 
transformative acts of popular collective will, and whereas legal positivism identifies democratic 
legitimacy with the correctly generated legal norms of a sovereign legislature, jurisgenerative politics is 
a model that permits us to think of creative interventions that mediate between universal norms and the 
will of democratic majorities.”).  
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independent value of pluralism. For example, as discussed in more detail 
below, we might favor a hybrid domestic-international tribunal over either 
a fully domestic or fully international one because it includes a more 
diverse range of actors, or we might favor complementarity or subsidiarity 
regimes because they encourage dialogue among multiple jurisdictions, and 
so on. In any event, pluralism questions whether a single world public 
order of the sort often contemplated both by nation-state sovereigntists and 
international law triumphalists is achievable, even assuming it were 
desirable. 
At the same time, mechanisms, institutions, and practices of the sort 
discussed in this Article require actors to at least be willing to take part in a 
common set of discursive forms. This is not as idealistic as it may at first 
appear. Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[t]he difficulties of inter-
cultural or religious-secular dialogue are often exaggerated when we talk 
about the incommensurability of cultural frameworks and the impossibility 
of conversation without a common conceptual scheme. In fact conversation 
between members of different cultural and religious communities is seldom 
a dialogue of the deaf . . . .”47 Nevertheless, it is certainly true that some 
normative systems deny even this limited goal of mutual dialogue. Such 
systems would (correctly) recognize the liberal bias within the vision of 
procedural pluralism I explore here,48 and they may reject the vision on that 
basis. For example, while abortion rights and antiabortion activists could, 
despite their differences, be said to share a willingness to engage in a 
common practice of constitutional adjudication, those bombing abortion 
clinics are not similarly willing, and accordingly there may not be any way 
to accommodate such actors even within a more pluralist framework. 
Likewise, communities that refuse to allow even the participation of 
particular subgroups, such as women or minorities, may be difficult to 
include within the pluralist vision I have in mind. Of course, these groups 
are undeniably important forces to recognize and take account of as a 
descriptive matter. But from a normative perspective, an embrace of 
pluralist mechanisms, institutions, and practices need not commit one to a 
worldview free from judgment, where all positions are equivalently 
embraced. Thus, I argue not necessarily for undifferentiated inclusion, but 
for a set of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that are more 
 
 47. Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom, J.L. PHIL. & 
CULTURE (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5–6). 
 48.  This is not to say that the vision of pluralism I explore should be taken as synonymous with 
liberalism, though they share many attributes. Pluralism arguably assigns an independent value to 
dialogue among communities and an importance to community affiliation that is absent from (or at least 
less central to) liberal theory. 
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likely to expand the range of voices heard or considered, thereby creating 
more opportunities to forge a common social space than either sovereigntist 
territorialism or universalism.49 
Finally, a pluralist framework suggests a research agenda that 
emphasizes the micro-interactions among different normative systems. 
Such a case study approach would serve as a contrast to rational choice and 
other forms of more abstract modeling, by focusing instead on thick 
description of the ways in which various procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices actually operate as sites of contestation and 
creative innovation. Thus, applying pluralism to the international arena 
illuminates a broader field of inquiry and asks scholars to consider studying 
in more depth the processes whereby normative gaps among communities 
are negotiated. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I summarize the literature on 
legal pluralism and suggest ways in which this literature helps us 
understand the global legal environment. Second, drawing on pluralist 
insights, I offer an analytical framework for addressing normative conflicts, 
one that provides an alternative both to territorially-based sovereigntism 
and to universalism, and instead opens space for the jurisgenerative 
interplay of multiple normative communities and commitments. This 
framework generates a series of values and principles that can be used to 
evaluate the efficacy of procedural mechanisms, institutional designs, and 
discursive practices for managing hybridity. Third, I survey a series of such 
mechanisms, institutions, and practices already in use in a wide variety of 
doctrinal contexts, and I discuss how they work (or sometimes fail to work) 
in on-the-ground settings. And though each of these mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices has been discussed individually in the scholarly 
literature, they have not generally been considered together through a 
pluralist lens, nor have they been evaluated based on their ability to manage 
and preserve hybridity. Thus, my analysis offers a significantly different 
approach, one that injects a distinct set of concerns into debates about 
global legal interactions. Indeed, although many of these mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices are often viewed as “second-best” 
accommodations between hard-line sovereigntist and universalist positions, 
I argue that they might at least sometimes be preferable to either. In the 
Conclusion, I suggest implications of this approach for more general 
thinking about the potential role of law in identifying and negotiating social 
 
 49. This focus on jurisgenerative structure, rather than on the necessary inclusion of, or 
deference to, all points of view, may differentiate legal pluralism as I use it here from multiculturalism. 
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and cultural difference. 
II.  LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
Scholars seeking to understand the multifaceted role of law in an era 
of globalization50 must take seriously the insights of legal pluralism. In 
general, theorists of pluralism start from the premise that people belong to 
(or feel affiliated with) multiple groups and understand themselves to be 
bound by the norms of these multiple groups.51 Such groups can, of course, 
 
 50. Of course, the idea of an “era of globalization” is contested. Indeed, the vast debates 
concerning globalization’s meaning, its importance, and even its existence could fill many volumes. For 
purposes of this Article, I do not attempt to articulate a single definition because part of the premise of 
law and globalization is that multiple definitions and meanings for globalization will be salient for 
different populations. See, e.g., SANTOS, supra note 2, at 178 (“There is strictly no single entity called 
globalization. There are, rather, globalizations, and we should use the term only in the plural.”). Thus, I 
use the term to refer generally to the intensification of global interconnectedness, in which capital, 
people, commodities, images, and ideologies move across distance and physical boundaries with 
increasing speed and frequency. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW 
GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING OUR LIVES 24–37 (2000) (pointing to the increased level of trade, 
finance, and capital flows, and describing the effects of the weakening hold of older nation-states). 
Indeed, I am content to acknowledge that the existence of many different visions of globalization is a 
fundamental part of globalization itself. 
  Even some who acknowledge globalization nevertheless question whether globalization is 
really a new phenomenon. Certainly, interrelations among multiple populations across territorial 
boundaries have existed for centuries. For example, some argue that the pre-1914 era was in fact the 
high-water mark for economic interdependence, although there is also evidence that the post-1989 era 
surpasses that period. See Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 10–14 (Miles Kahler & 
David A. Lake eds., 2003). Again, I do not think such arguments need detain us. First, it seems clear 
that something is going on, given the pervasiveness of the ideology of market capitalism, the speed of 
commodity, capital, and personal movement, the ubiquity of global media, and so on. Whether such 
developments are truly new (or greater than ever before) seems less important than understanding the 
consequences of the phenomena. Second, I see the term “globalization” as also signifying the attitude 
about the world that tends to come into being as a result of frequent use of the term itself. Indeed, in a 
certain sense it does not really matter whether, as an empirical matter, the world is more or less 
“globalized” than it used to be. More important is the fact that people—whether governmental actors, 
corporations, scholars, or general citizens—think and act as if the world is more interconnected and 
treat globalization as a real phenomenon. In addition, there is at least some evidence that global 
“scripts” are exerting a broad impact at least in the officially sanctioned discourse of governmental 
bureaucrats. See, e.g., John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 
145 (1997) (“Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures 
and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all of the domains of 
rationalized social life . . . .”). For further discussion of “the problematics of globalization,” see Paul 
Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 
551–55 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, From International to Global]. 
 51. See, e.g., AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM 2 (1995) 
(defining pluralist theories as those that “seek to organize and conceptualize political phenomena on the 
basis of the plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which individuals seek to advance 
and, more importantly, to develop, their interests”). 
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include familiar political affiliations, such as nation-states, counties, towns, 
and so on. But many community affiliations, such as those held by 
transnational or subnational ethnic groups, religious institutions, trade 
organizations, unions, Internet chat groups, and a myriad of other “norm-
generating communities”52 may at various times exert tremendous power 
over our actions even though they are not part of an “official” state-based 
system. Indeed, as scholars of legal pluralism have long noted, “not all the 
phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their source in 
government.”53 
Just as importantly, legal pluralists have studied those situations in 
which two or more state and non-state normative systems occupy the same 
social field and must negotiate the resulting hybrid legal space.54 
Historically, anthropologically-oriented legal pluralists focused on the 
overlapping normative systems created during the process of 
colonization.55 Early twentieth-century studies of indigenous law among 
tribes and villages in colonized societies noted the simultaneous existence 
of both local law and European law.56 Indeed, British colonial law actually 
incorporated Hindu, Muslim, and Christian personal law into its 
administrative framework.57 This early pluralist scholarship focused on the 
hierarchical coexistence of what were imagined to be quite separate legal 
systems, layered one on top of the other. Thus, for example, when Leopold 
Pospisil documented the way in which Kapauku Papuans responded to the 
imposition of Dutch law, it was relatively easy to identify the two distinct 
legal fields since Dutch law and Kapauku law were extremely different.58 
As a result, Pospisil could readily identify the degree of penetration of 
Dutch law, both those areas in which the Kapauku had appropriated and 
transformed Dutch law, and those areas in which negotiations between the 
two legal systems were part of broader political struggle.59 Despite the 
somewhat reductionist cast of the model, these pioneering studies 
 
 52. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 43. 
 53. Moore, Legal Systems of the World, supra note 2, at 15. See also Gunther Teubner, The Two 
Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1992) (“[L]egal 
pluralism is at the same time both: social norms and legal rules, law and society, formal and informal, 
rule-oriented and spontaneous.”). But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ 
Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192, 193 (1993) (arguing that such a broad view of “law” 
causes law to lose any distinctive meaning). 
 54. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2. 
 55. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 869–72 (summarizing the literature). 
 56. See, e.g., BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926). 
 57. Merry, Spatial Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 12. See infra Part III.C. 
 58. See Pospisil, supra note 5. 
 59. See id. 
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established the key insights of legal pluralism: a recognition that multiple 
normative orders exist and a focus on the dialectical interaction between 
and among these normative orders.60 
In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropological scholars of pluralism 
complicated the picture in three significant ways. First, they questioned the 
hierarchical model of one legal system simply dominating the other and 
instead argued that plural systems are often semiautonomous, operating 
within the framework of other legal fields, but not entirely governed by 
them.61 As Sally Engle Merry recounts, this was an extraordinarily 
powerful conceptual move because it placed “at the center of investigation 
the relationship between the official legal system and other forms of 
ordering that connect with but are in some ways separate from and 
dependent on it.”62 Second, scholars began to conceptualize the interaction 
between legal systems as bidirectional, with each influencing (and helping 
to constitute) the other.63 This was a distinct shift from the early studies, 
which had tended only to investigate ways in which state law penetrated 
and changed indigenous systems and not the other way round. Third, 
scholars defined the idea of a “legal system” sufficiently broadly to include 
many types of nonofficial normative ordering, and therefore argued that 
such legal subgroups operate not just in colonial societies, but in advanced 
industrialized settings as well.64 
Of course, finding non-state forms of normative ordering is sometimes 
more difficult outside the colonial context because there is no obvious 
indigenous system, and the less formal ordering structures tend to “blend 
more readily into the landscape.”65 Thus, pluralists argued that, in order to 
see non-state law, scholars would first need to reject what John Griffiths 
called “the ideology of legal centralism,” the exclusive positivist focus on 
state law and its system of lawyers, courts, and prisons.66 Instead, pluralists 
turned to documenting “forms of social regulation that draw on the symbols 
of the law, to a greater or lesser extent, but that operate in its shadows, its 
parking lots, and even down the street in mediation offices.”67 
 
 60. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 873. 
 61. See, e.g., Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social Field, supra note 2; Robert L. Kidder, 
Toward an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 289 (Sandra B. Burman & 
Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 1979). 
 62. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 873. 
 63. See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1984). 
 64. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 870–71 (summarizing some of the literature). 
 65. Id. at 873. 
 66. Griffiths, supra note 2, at 3. 
 67. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 874. 
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Meanwhile, scholars drawing more from political theory than 
anthropology have long focused on the fact that, prior to the rise of the state 
system, much lawmaking took place in autonomous institutions and within 
smaller units such as cities and guilds, while large geographic areas were 
left largely unregulated.68 And, like the anthropologists, they have observed 
a whole range of non-state lawmaking even in modern nation-states: in 
tribal or ethnic enclaves,69 religious organizations,70 corporate bylaws, 
social customs,71 private regulatory bodies, and a wide variety of groups, 
associations, and non-state institutions.72 For example, in England bodies 
such as the church, the stock exchange, the legal profession, the insurance 
market, and even the Jockey Club opted for forms of self-regulation that 
included machinery for arbitrating disputes among their own members.73 
Moreover, “private, closely knit, homogeneous micro-societies can create 
their own norms that at times trump state law and at other times fill lacunae 
in state regulation but nonetheless operate autonomously.”74 Finally, such 
scholars have sometimes focused on religious communities and their 
ongoing tensions with state authorities.75 
More recently, a new group of legal pluralists has emerged under the 
 
 68. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 14–38 (Walter 
L. Moll trans., Russell & Russell 1962) (1936) (analyzing and describing the differences between legal 
and nonlegal norms). See generally OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND 
EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977) (n.d.) (setting 
forth a legal philosophy based on the concept of association as a fundamental human organizing 
principle); OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1934) (presenting a theory of the evolution of the state and non-state 
groups according to the principle of natural law). 
 69. See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case 
of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993) (delineating the subtle interactions between the legal 
system of the Romani people and the norms of their host countries). 
 70. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 71. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43–49 (1968) (describing “implicit law,” 
which includes everything from rules governing a camping trip among friends to the customs of 
merchants). 
 72. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (drawing on an empirical study of relations among cattle ranchers to develop a theory 
of nonlegal norms as a source of social control); Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: 
The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185 (1987) 
(discussing the concept of legality as reflected in popular culture); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (presenting empirical data on 
nonlegal dispute settlement in the manufacturing industry); Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: 
An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989) (surveying the sources of popular perceptions of the law). 
 73. See F.W. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 189–95 
(H.D. Hazeltine, G. Lapsley & P.H. Winfield eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1936) (1905) (describing the 
sophisticated nonlegal means of enforcing order among members of these institutions). 
 74. Levit, supra note 27, at 184. For some examples, see supra note 29. 
 75. See supra note 6. 
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rubric of social norms theory. Interestingly, however, these scholars rarely 
refer to the anthropologists and political theorists who have long explored 
pluralism, perhaps because social norms theory has emerged as a branch of 
behavioral law and economics. The study of social norms, in its most 
capacious formulation, focuses on the variety of “rules and standards that 
impose limits on acceptable behavior.”76 Such social norms “may be the 
product of custom and usage, organizational affiliations, consensual 
undertakings and individual conscience.”77 In addition, “norm 
entrepreneurs,” defined as individuals or groups who try to influence 
popular opinion in order to inculcate a social norm, may consciously try to 
mobilize social pressure to sustain or create social norms.78 And while 
some pluralists think that this broader category of social norms dilutes legal 
pluralism’s historic focus on more stable religious, ethnic, or tribal 
groupings,79 social norms theory has the benefit of theorizing larger 
transnational communities that may be based on long-term rhetorical 
persuasion rather than face-to-face interaction.80 Indeed, social norms 
theory tends to emphasize processes whereby norms are internalized 
through guilt, self-bereavement, a sense of duty, and a desire for esteem, or 
simply by slowly altering categories of thought and the set of taken-for-
granted ideas that constitute one’s sense of “the way things are.”81 
 
 76. William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 546 (1994). 
 77. Id. See also, e.g., David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual 
Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1841 (1996) (noting that norms are said to evolve from the 
repeated dealings of contracting parties or industry consensus and that these norms are enforced both 
privately and through legal mechanisms). 
 78. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 482 (1990) (defining “transnational moral entrepreneurs” as 
nongovernmental transnational organizations who (1) “mobilize popular opinion and political support 
both within their host country and abroad”; (2) “stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded 
organizations in other countries”; (3) “play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its 
identification with the national interests of their government”; and (4) often direct their efforts “toward 
persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a particular prohibition regime reflects a 
widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the peculiar moral code of one society”). See, 
e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 
INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 647 (1998). 
 79. See, e.g., Dane, supra note 3, at 991–92 (“There must . . . be some way to tell a true 
competing sovereign from any other assemblage. . . . If every social order that the state confronts is a 
legal order, there is no legal order. If every legal thought is law, there is no law.”). 
 80. Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 84 (2005) (“[T]he group 
can consist of cattle ranchers in a county who interact on a regular basis or of millions of people who 
live on separate continents who, when taken individually, have a virtual statistical impossibility of 
interacting with each other even once in their lifetimes.”). 
 81. Such unexamined ideas about legal reality are part of what sociolegal scholars describe as 
“legal consciousness.” See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: 
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). See also JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF 
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Those who study international public and private law have not, 
historically, paid much attention either to legal pluralism or social norms 
theory. This is because the emphasis traditionally has been on state-to-state 
relations. Indeed, international law has generally emphasized bilateral and 
multilateral treaties between and among states, the activities of the United 
Nations, the pronouncements of international tribunals, and (somewhat 
more controversially) the norms that states had obeyed for long enough that 
such norms could be deemed customary.82 This was a legal universe with 
two guiding principles. First, law was deemed to reside only in the acts of 
official, state-sanctioned entities. Second, law was seen as an exclusive 
function of state sovereignty.83 
 
RESISTANCE: CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE 4–5 (1985) (arguing that 
consciousness is “embedded in the practical constitution of everyday life, part and parcel of the process 
whereby the subject is constructed by external sociocultural forms”); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal 
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) (“[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the 
force that it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the 
world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would 
want to live.”); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 575, 604 (1984) (“Law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the role of an 
individual in society and the relations with others that make sense.”). For a discussion of how 
international legal norms can have real impact by shaping legal consciousness over time, see Paul 
Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) 
[hereinafter Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits] (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, 
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)). 
 82. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060 (stating that the primary sources of international law are international treaties and conventions, 
customary practices of states accepted as law, and general principles of law common to most legal 
systems). 
 83. Of course, this is an over-simplified vision of international law. Obviously, non-state 
sources—including the idea of natural law itself—have long played a key role in the development of 
international legal principles. See generally David J. Bederman, Religion and the Sources of 
International Law in Antiquity, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991) (tracing the role of religion in the Near East during 
the empires of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Hittites, Mittani, Israelites, Greek city-states, Indian states 
before 150 B.C., and Mediterranean powers from 338 to 168 B.C.). Indeed, prior to Bentham, these 
non-state sources, including the universal common law of jus gentium, were arguably far more 
important than the norms generated by states. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2605 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
(1995)) (noting that medieval legal scholars viewed the law of nations, understood as jus naturae et 
gentium, as a universal law binding upon all mankind). For example, during the Middle Ages, treaties—
which are usually viewed today as the positive law of state interaction—were deemed subject to the 
overarching jurisdiction of the Church because they were sealed by oaths. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 24 (1947). Even later, no less a theorist than Vattel, while 
repudiating natural law’s religious underpinnings, see MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (4th ed. 2003), continued to ground international law in the laws of nature. 
See E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED TO THE 
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Both principles, however, have eroded over time. The rise of a 
conception of international human rights in the post-World War II era 
transformed individuals into international law stakeholders, possessing 
their own entitlements against the state.84 But even apart from individual 
empowerment, scholars have more recently come to recognize the myriad 
ways in which the prerogatives of nation-states are cabined by transnational 
and international actors. Whereas F.A. Mann could confidently state in 
1984 that “laws extend so far as, but no further than the sovereignty of the 
State which puts them into force,”85 many international law scholars have, 
at least since the end of the Cold War, argued that such a narrow view of 
how law operates transnationally is inadequate. Thus, the past fifteen years 
have seen increasing attention to the important—though sometimes 
inchoate—processes of international norm development.86 Such processes 
inevitably lead scholars to consider overlapping transnational jurisdictional 
assertions by nation-states, as well as norms articulated by international 
bodies, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), multinational 
corporations and industry groups, indigenous communities, transnational 
terrorists, networks of activists, and so on. 
Yet, while international law scholars are increasingly emphasizing the 
importance of these overlapping legal and quasi-legal communities, there 
has been surprisingly little attention paid to the pluralism literature.87 This 
 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS lviii (London, G.G. & J. Robinson 1797) 
(1792). In the nineteenth century, though positivism reigned both in the United States and abroad, 
transnational non-state actors nevertheless played important roles. See Koh, supra, at 2612 (noting the 
work of William Wilberforce and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society; Henry Dunant and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross; and Christian peace activists, such as America’s William 
Ladd and Elihu Burritt, “who promoted public international arbitration and permanent international 
criminal courts”). And, of course, natural law principles continue to undergird many international law 
doctrines, such as jus cogens norms. See JANIS, supra, at 64. Thus, the focus on non-state norm-
generation is not a new phenomenon, but I argue that it is reemerging as a significant branch of 
scholarship within international law and might even call for a reclassification of international law itself. 
 84. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Introduction, in JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, xi, 
xii (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999) (noting that “since the Second World War, an increasing number of 
international norms of both customary and conventional provenance . . . now restrict or displace 
specific law-making and applying competences of states”); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State 
“Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 33 (1995–1996) (“At mid-century, the international 
system began a slow, hesitant move from state values towards human values.”). But see JANIS, supra 
note 83, at 5–6; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 34–36 (3d ed. 1957) (both noting 
that even after Nuremberg, international law derived primarily from state practice). 
 85. F.A. MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION REVISITED AFTER TWENTY 
YEARS, in 3 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 20 (1985). 
 86. See Berman, From International to Global, supra note 50, at 488–89 (summarizing some of 
this literature). 
 87. There are some exceptions. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, International Legal 
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is a shame, because this literature could help international law find a more 
comprehensive framework for conceptualizing the clash of normative 
communities in the modern world. Consider, for example, Sally Falk 
Moore’s idea of the “semiautonomous social field,” which she describes as 
one that: 
can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that . . . is 
also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from 
the larger world by which it is surrounded. The semi-autonomous social 
field has rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce 
compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which 
can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons 
inside it, sometimes at its own instance.88 
Notice that, following Moore’s idea, we can conceive of a legal system as 
both autonomous and permeable; outside norms affect the system, but do 
not dominate it fully. The framework thus captures a dialectical and 
iterative interplay that we see among normative communities in the 
international system, an interplay that rigidly territorialist or positivist 
visions of legal authority do not address. 
Even more fundamentally, legal pluralists have observed ways in 
which state law and other normative orders mutually constitute each other. 
Thus, for example, the family and its legal order are obviously shaped by 
the state, but the state in turn is shaped by the family and its legal order 
because each is part of the other.89 And though pluralists were historically 
thinking of the state’s relationship to internal non-state law within its 
borders, the framework is equally cogent in studying external dialectical 
interactions both with other states, and with various international or 
transnational legal communities. Indeed, recent international law 
scholarship emphasizes ways in which states are changed simply by the 
fact that they are part of an international network of states.90 Such an 
insight echoes pluralism’s co-constitutive approach. 
In addition, pluralism offers possibilities for thinking about spaces of 
resistance to state law. Indeed, by recognizing at least the semiautonomy of 
 
Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling 
Durability of Gentili’s Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 713 (1998); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247 
(2006). 
 88. Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social Field, supra note 2, at 720. 
 89. See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY 
AND THE STATE 159 (David Sugarman ed., 1983). 
 90. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). 
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conflicting legal orders, pluralism necessarily examines limits to the 
ideological power of state legal pronouncements. Pluralists do not deny the 
significance of state law and coercive power, of course, but they do try to 
identify places where state law does not penetrate or penetrates only 
partially, and where alternative forms of ordering persist to provide 
opportunities for resistance, contestation, and alternative vision. Such an 
approach encourages international law scholars to treat the multiple sites of 
normative authority in the global legal system as a set of inevitable 
interactions to be managed, not as a “problem” to be “solved.” And again, 
though pluralists historically looked only at non-state alternatives to state 
power, the international law context adds state-to-state relations and their 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions to the mix, providing yet another set of 
possible alternative normative communities to the web of pluralist 
interactions. 
Finally, pluralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist 
definition of “law.” For example, with legal pluralism as our analytical 
frame, we can get beyond the endless debates both about whether 
international law is law at all and whether it has any real effect. Indeed, the 
whole debate about law versus non-law is largely irrelevant in a pluralism 
context because the key questions involve the normative commitments of a 
community and the interactions among normative orders that give rise to 
such commitments, not their formal status. Thus, we can resist positivist 
reductionism and set nation-state law within a broader context.91 Moreover, 
an emphasis on social norms allows us to more readily see how it is that 
non-state legal norms can have significant impact in the world. After all, if 
a statement of norms is ultimately internalized by a population, that 
statement will have important binding force, often even more so than a 
formal law backed by state sanction.92 Accordingly, by taking pluralism 
seriously we will more easily see the way in which the contest over norms 
creates legitimacy over time, and we can put to rest the idea that norms not 
associated with nation-states necessarily lack significance.93 Indeed, legal 
 
 91. For those who are inclined to reify state law as law and to deny all other forms of social 
ordering the use of the word law, Santos argues that law is like medicine. Thus, he observes that: 
side by side with the official, professionalized, pharmochemical, allopathic medicine, other 
forms of medicine circulate in society: traditional, herbal, community-based, magical, non-
Western medicines. Why should the designation of medicine be restricted to the first type of 
medicine, the only one recognized as such by the national health system? Clearly, a politics of 
definition is at work here, and its working should be fully unveiled and dealt with in its own 
terms. 
SANTOS, supra note 2, at 91. 
 92. For a discussion of the importance of legal consciousness scholarship to international law 
thinking, see Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits, supra note 81, at 1280–95. 
 93. See id. (critiquing a positivist rational choice approach to international law on this ground). 
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pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has the formal authority to 
articulate norms or the coercive power to enforce them. Instead, they aim to 
study empirically which statements of authority tend to be treated as 
binding in actual practice and by whom. 
Of course, there are differences among forms of ordering, particularly 
given that some legal forms have coercive state power behind them and 
some do not.94 And, obviously, disparities in political and economic power 
strongly affect how much influence any particular normative community is 
likely to have. But even those differences are not completely determinative. 
After all, even if formal legal institutions have a near monopoly on 
legitimate use of force, there are many other forms of effective coercion 
and inducement wielded by non-state actors.95 In addition, official legal 
norms that are contrary to prevailing customary or community norms will 
often have little or no real world effect, at least without the willingness (or 
capability) of coercive bodies to exercise sustained force to impose such 
norms. Thus, obedience to norms frequently reflects sociopolitical reality 
more than the status of those norms as “law.” As a result, “[d]efining the 
essence of law or custom is less valuable than situating these concepts in 
particular sets of relations between particular legal orders in particular 
historical contexts.”96 
In any event, the important point is that scholars studying the global 
legal scene need not rehash long and ultimately fruitless debates (both in 
philosophy97 and anthropology98) about what constitutes law and can 
instead take a non-essentialist position: treating as law that which people 
view as law.99 This formulation turns the what-is-law question into a 
descriptive inquiry concerning which social norms are recognized as 
authoritative sources of obligation and by whom.100 Indeed, the question of 
 
 94. See, e.g., SANTOS, supra note 2, at 91 (arguing that we must “counteract the romantic bias of 
much legal pluralistic thinking” and “avoid equating simplistically all legal orders coexisting in a given 
geopolitical unit, and particularly . . . avoid denying the centrality of state law in modern sociolegal 
fields”). 
 95. See Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social Field, supra note 2, at 721. See also LEOPOLD 
POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 97–126 (1971); MAX WEBER, LAW IN 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 18–19 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954) (describing means of coercion applied by 
“private” organizations); WEBER, supra at 38 (describing the limits of state power to regulate activities 
in the economic sphere). 
 96. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 889. 
 97. Compare, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), with LON. L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW (1964), and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 98. Compare, e.g., MALINOWSKI, supra note 56, with E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF 
PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (1954). 
 99. For a statement of this approach, see Tamanaha, supra note 2. 
 100. Such an approach echoes Paul Bohannan’s focus on “double institutionalization,” the process 
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what constitutes law is itself revealed as a terrain of contestation among 
multiple actors.101 And, by broadening the scope of what counts as law, we 
can turn our attention to a more comprehensive investigation of how best to 
mediate the hybrid spaces where normative systems and communities 
overlap and clash. It is to that question that this Article now turns. 
III.  A PLURALIST FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING LEGAL 
CONFLICTS 
Instead of assuming that states provide the only possible relevant 
normative systems and instead of thinking only about “solving” legal 
disputes by identifying a single relevant legal authority, we need a 
framework for conceptualizing normative conflict that is more pluralist. 
Such an approach recognizes that, in a multivalent world, many 
communities are likely to be affected by a single act and will therefore seek 
to regulate it. Thus, as a purely descriptive matter, hybridity cannot be 
wished away. 
More normatively, we might sometimes prefer procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, and practices that seek to manage, without 
eliminating, hybridity. Such a pluralist approach would aim to create or 
preserve spaces where normative conflicts can be constructively addressed 
and opportunities for contestation can be retained. This Part therefore 
draws on legal pluralism to develop a set of principles that should guide the 
design of these sorts of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices. 
First, though, I consider two alternative responses to a world of plural 
norms: reasserting territorialist state prerogative on the one hand, and 
seeking universal harmonization on the other. I argue that both approaches 
are at least sometimes normatively unattractive, and—perhaps more 
importantly—they are also likely only ever to be partially successful at 
best. 
 
whereby secondary institutional arrangements are developed to assess which primary norms are deemed 
authoritative. See Paul Bohannan, Law and Legal Institutions, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 73 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). See also PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, 
LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 13 (1978) (adopting a similar 
formulation). 
 101. This is one of the reasons anthropologists turned away from the essentialist debate. See 
LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 31 (2002). 
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A.  SOVEREIGNTIST TERRITORIALISM 
One response to plural assertions of norms is simply to reject the 
legitimacy of all communities but the territorially-defined nation-state. This 
argument tends to take a variety of forms. With respect to immigration, for 
example, we may see calls to close or restrict borders to keep out foreign 
influence.102 In the judicial context, critics argue that it is illegitimate for 
judges to consider norms expressed by non-state legal communities, 
particularly those located outside the territorial bounds of the state.103 And 
in the discourse of conflict of laws—jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
judgment recognition—rules for establishing legal authority might be (and 
historically have been) demarcated along territorialist and statist lines.104 
Of course, there may well be occasions when nation-states can ill 
afford to defer to non-state normative assertions. For example, substate 
communities—whether separatist ethnic groups or local warlords—may so 
threaten the authority of the state that no viable legal order is possible 
without attempting to eliminate the alternative norm altogether. In addition, 
there can be little doubt that, even short of exercising such authority, 
nation-states play dominant roles within the geopolitical order because they 
can deploy coercive force and therefore often wield tremendous power. 
Thus, an embrace of pluralist possibilities in no way commits one to a 
belief that the nation-state is dying or should be deemed unimportant. 
Nevertheless, in many instances there is no intrinsic reason to 
privilege nation-state communities over others. If, to use Benedict 
Anderson’s famous phrase, nation-states are “imagined communities,”105 
then nation-state bonds are neither natural nor inevitable; they are merely 
one particular way of imagining community among many. As such, we 
must turn our attention to the ways in which conceptions of “community” 
are constructed within social life, on how membership in a community is 
marked and attributed, and on how notions of community are given 
meaning.106 In doing so, we recognize that community formation is a 
 
 102. See sources cited supra note 33. 
 103. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004). 
 104. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Towards 
a Cosmopolitan Vision] (criticizing this approach). 
 105. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that nation-states are imagined communities 
“because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”). 
 106. See NIGEL RAPPORT & JOANNA OVERING, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE 
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psychological process, not a naturally occurring phenomenon based on 
external realities.107 
“Community,” of course, is a notoriously difficult world to define, and 
I will not attempt to do so here.108 But we need not agree upon a definition 
of community to recognize that, whatever the definition is, we can no 
longer think of communities as culturally unified groups naturally tied to a 
territory.109 And while such a definition may never have been entirely 
accurate, the dissolution of this tie remains an important trend. 
Acknowledging community affiliations that exist apart from the 
nation-state therefore becomes crucial. And by analyzing the social 
meaning of our affiliations across space, we can think about various 
alternative conceptions of community that are subnational, transnational, 
supranational, or epistemic.110 This is not to deny the symbolically 
significant, constantly-reinforced, and sometimes historically-rooted power 
of the nation-state in the collective imagination of its citizens. Nor is it to 
deemphasize the importance of nation-state communities. It is only to say 
that these are not the only potentially relevant community associations 
people might feel. Moreover, although “the scale of the nation-state may 
once have enabled it to respond to many human problems, . . . national 
boundaries no longer correspond (if they ever did) to capital formation, 
personal opportunities, or risk.”111 Thus, we should recognize the 
possibility that other affiliations may sometimes be more deeply felt than 
bonds of loyalty to nation-states. 
Meanwhile, if territorial location is of less significance now than it 
once was, we increasingly face normative questions about whether legal 
rules based on territory are desirable. Again, this is not to say that territory 
 
KEY CONCEPTS 62 (2000) (discussing modern anthropological views regarding community). 
 107. See, e.g., Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the End of 
an Era, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 13 (Akhil Gupta 
& James Ferguson eds., 1997) (arguing that “community” is “a categorical identity that is premised on 
various forms of exclusion and constructions of otherness”). 
 108. I do make a more systematic attempt to discuss various definitions of community in Berman, 
Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 459–72. 
 109. See JEAN-MARIE GUÉHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 17 (Victoria Elliott trans., 
1995) (“The spatial solidarity of territorial communities is disappearing, to be replaced by temporary 
interest groups. . . . From the beginning, since the Greek city (polis), politics has been the art of 
governing a collectivity of people defined by their rootedness in a location, city, or nation. [But] 
solidarity can no longer be locked into geography . . . .”). 
 110. For further discussion of these multiple forms of community, see id. at 527–46. 
 111.  Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Democratic Federalism and the Sovereigntism 
of the Nation-State, 56 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs]. 
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is unimportant, but it is difficult to deny that we are increasingly affected 
by activities and decisions that take place far from us in a spatial sense.112 
Such deterritorialized effects have always been present to some extent, of 
course. One need only look at the history of empire to realize that the 
strings of governance were often pulled by far-off rulers. But at least in the 
pre-modern world such political arrangements, perhaps because of the slow 
pace of transportation and communications, rarely meant strong centralized 
control of distant realms. Rather, the social construction of space was 
organized around many centers, with a patchwork of overlapping and 
incomplete rights of government.113 And, although cross-border interaction 
obviously is not a new phenomenon, in an electronically connected world 
the effects of any given action may immediately be felt elsewhere with no 
relationship to physical geography at all. 
Indeed, the globalization of capital, the movement of people and 
goods across borders, the reach of global corporate activity, the impact of 
worldwide NGOs, and the development, in recent decades, of over a 
hundred international or transnational tribunals114 all make it far more 
likely that local communities will be affected by activities and entities with 
no local presence. As a thought experiment, one can imagine an “effects 
map,” in which one identifies a territorial locality and plots on a map every 
action that has an effect on that locality.115 Five hundred years ago, such 
effects would almost surely have been clustered around the territory, with 
perhaps some additional effects located in a particular distant imperial 
location. A hundred years ago, those effects might have begun spreading 
out. But today, while locality is surely not irrelevant, the effects would 
likely be diffused over many corporate, governmental, technological, and 
migratory centers. 
In a world of such extraterritorial effects, it is unrealistic to expect 
legal rules based on territory to be satisfactory. Indeed, it was in part the 
realization of the many distant acts and actors causing local effects that 
spurred the loosening of territorial rules for jurisdiction and choice of law 
in the twentieth century. For example, U.S. rules for allocating 
 
 112. See supra note 50. 
 113. See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 149 (1993) (noting that pre-modern states were not based 
principally on territorial sovereignty and that, instead, medieval Europe was in some ways an archetype 
for nonexclusive territorial rule; its “patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government . . . 
[was] inextricably superimposed and tangled”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 115. This thought experiment is derived from David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1371–73 (2002). 
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jurisdictional authority have shifted from a territorialist vision that gave 
states complete authority within their territorial boundaries and no authority 
beyond them to a more flexible approach.116 Likewise, choice of law rules 
that once used the territorial location of a significant act or actor as the only 
relevant factor now generally include a broader range of considerations.117 
Yet, such rules still arguably overemphasize contacts with a territorially-
based legal authority, and it would not be surprising to see such rules 
evolve in the course of the increasingly deterritorialized twenty-first 
century.118 
Of course, some maintain that only territorially defined nation-state 
communities can legitimately claim to exercise democratically grounded 
power. Such arguments have been much rehearsed in the scholarly 
literature,119 and a full explication of these debates is far beyond the scope 
of this Article. Here I make only a few observations, which I think are 
sufficient to at least complicate the claim that the imperatives of democratic 
sovereignty necessarily render consideration of transnational, international, 
or non-state jurisdictional assertions illegitimate. 
First, it is no threat to sovereignty for a nation-state to decide that its 
sovereign interests are advanced overall by making agreements with other 
nations that limit what it can otherwise do. Thus, international 
jurisdictional assertions that derive from such agreements do not implicate 
concerns about democratic sovereignty. 
Second, both international human rights norms and international 
institutions may actually strengthen domestic democracy, properly 
understood. This is because constitutional democracy already includes 
within it the idea that “all people (and not merely the majority) can 
associate themselves with the project of self-government.”120 Thus, 
 
 116. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), with Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945). 
 117. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
 118. For an extended argument along these lines, see Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra 
note 11. 
 119. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 
133 n.4 (2006) (citing articles). 
 120. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 19 (2001). See also 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) 
(criticizing what he terms “the majoritarian premise”—the idea that when a group must make a 
collective decision, fairness requires the decision favored by a majority of its members—and arguing 
instead for a “constitutional” conception of democracy that requires rights to autonomy and equality as 
a precondition to democratic legitimacy); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 893, 897–909 (1990) (criticizing majoritarian theories of popular sovereignty on the ground 
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obedience to human rights norms that minimally protect minority interests 
or multilateral institutions that help guard against capture of government by 
majority factions actually enhance democracy rather than subvert it.121 And 
while such international regimes will not always have these salutary 
effects, that is an argument to amend those regimes, not to reject 
international norms or institutions altogether. 
Third, at least when foreign, international, or non-state norms are 
formally incorporated into domestic law, such incorporation usually occurs 
through the actions of domestic political actors on either the national or 
local level. Indeed, as Judith Resnik has documented, at least in the United 
States local actors are, and have been, major sources through which 
“foreign” law has become part of U.S. traditions.122 Moreover, when city 
councils or state legislatures debate and enact provisions incorporating 
foreign or international norms, there can be no objection from a 
majoritarian or federalist perspective.123 And while the actions of judges 
tend to be more controversial, once one accepts the basic democratic 
legitimacy of countermajoritarian judges exercising judicial review, then it 
is difficult to see why there is an additional democratic legitimacy 
argument against those same judges issuing opinions that may sometimes 
be influenced by non-state norms, such as international or foreign law 
(there may be normative objections to the content of particular rulings, but 
that is not an argument about democratic legitimacy). As Mark Tushnet has 
argued, “The rules made by supranational institutions become domestic 
U.S. law only through the operation of U.S. domestic institutions subject to 
the checks-and-balances system.”124 Thus, there seems to be little reason to 
think that the sky is falling. 
For similar reasons, because the judges involved are domestic political 
actors, it is unclear why there are sovereignty or democracy objections to 
judges considering the law of a foreign jurisdiction when resolving a 
 
that they are irreconcilable with the Constitution itself, which explicitly places limits on 
majoritarianism). 
 121. See generally, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-
Enhancing Multilateralism (Int’l Law & Justice Working Papers, Paper No. 2007/4, 2007) (discussing 
international institutions), available at http://www.iilj.org/working%20papers/2007-4KMMGA.htm; 
Jamie Mayerfeld, Does International Human Rights Law Subvert Democracy? (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (discussing international human rights). 
 122. See Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 44–68).   
 123. See id. (manuscript at 7) (“Once attention is paid to the degree to which local actors are 
major source[s] through which ‘foreign’ law becomes part of United States traditions, one can see that 
sovereigntism has no special relationship either to majoritarianism or to federalism.”).  
 124. Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 263 
(2003). 
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choice-of-law question with multistate elements.125 Indeed, there should be 
even fewer objections in the choice-of-law context because statutory rules 
promulgated by legislatures are rarely enacted with an eye to international 
disputes or conduct.126 And, even when legislators do consider activities 
abroad, they do so to pursue domestic policy priorities, with little 
consideration of multistate implications. Yet, the mere fact that a dispute is 
multinational necessarily means that it implicates interests that are different 
from a purely domestic dispute, including the state’s interest in being part 
of a well-functioning, interlocking global system. Accordingly, judges may 
actually be effectuating broader sovereign interests by incorporating non-
state norms into their decisions in multistate cases.127 
Finally, and most fundamentally, legal norms have always migrated 
across territorial boundaries, and precepts that come to be thought of as 
constitutive of a community can often be traced historically to ideas 
borrowed from foreign sources.128 Accordingly, even as some seek 
legislatively to enjoin judges from relying on foreign or international law, 
others deploy foreign and international law in legal and political arguments, 
or they formally announce solidarity with international treaties as a way of 
cementing transnational community affiliations. “Ideas, norms, and 
practices do not stop at the lines that people draw across land,”129 and 
international norms are always translated into local vernacular. This 
process of “vernacularization,”130 and the debate about ideas, norms, and 
practices that go along with it, are and always have been part of democratic 
discourse, not in opposition to it.131 As Seyla Benhabib has argued, 
 
 125. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15, at 577 (“The national courts that develop international norms 
are connected to a national legislative or political unit that can revisit apparent judicial over-reaching.”).  
 126. Id. at 548–49. 
 127. See Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 104, at 1864 (“[A]s courts consider 
multiple community affiliations and develop hybrid rules for resolving multistate disputes, they do so 
not because they are ignoring the policy choices of their home state, but because they are effectuating 
their state’s broader interest in taking part in a global community.”). 
 128. See Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 34) (“Certain legal 
precepts are now seen to be foundational to the United States, and proudly so. But one should label 
them ‘made in the USA’ knowing that—like other “American” products—their parts and designs are 
produced abroad.”). 
 129. Id. (manuscript at 34). 
 130. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 1 (2006) (“In order for human rights ideas to be 
effective . . . they need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and 
meaning. They need, in other words, to be remade in the vernacular.”).  
 131. See Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 68) (“[O]ne must 
learn not to equate ‘the foreign’ with democratic deficits because democratic iterations are a regular 
route by which ‘the foreign’ becomes domestic.”). For an example of such democratic iterations, see id. 
(manuscript at 86–89) (describing activities surrounding efforts to encourage divestment from Sudan). 
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The spread of cosmopolitan norms . . . has yielded a . . . political 
condition [in which] the local, the national and the global are all 
imbricated in one another. Future democratic iterations will make their 
interconnections and interdependence deeper and wider. Rather than 
seeing this situation as undermining democratic sovereignty, we can 
view it as promising the emergence of new political configurations and 
new forms of agency . . . .132 
These points about nation-state communities, territoriality, and 
democratic legitimacy are sure to be convincing to some and unconvincing 
to others. But regardless of where one comes down concerning these 
various normative arguments, the most important point to remember is that 
a total rejection of foreign, international, or non-state influence and 
authority is unlikely to be fully successful in a world of global interaction 
and cross-border activity. Indeed, seen from the point of view of U.S. 
historical practice, “sovereigntists have a dismal track record, in that 
American law is constantly being made and remade through exchanges, 
some frank and some implicit, with normative views from abroad. Laws—
like people—migrate. Legal borders, like physical ones, are permeable, and 
seepage is everywhere.”133  
Even a country as economically and militarily powerful as the United 
States cannot go it alone.134 Consider the examples discussed at the 
beginning of this Article. After the French court issued judgment against 
Yahoo!,135 the service provider filed suit in federal district court in 
California seeking a declaration that the judgment would be unenforceable 
pursuant to the First Amendment.136 Leaving aside the merits of this suit137 
(which was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds138), what would it 
mean, in practical terms, for the United States to declare its unwillingness 
to enforce the French order? As it turns out, very little. Certainly if Yahoo! 
wants to continue to operate in France or the European Union or anywhere 
 
 132. BENHABIB, supra note 46, at 74. 
 133. Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 69). 
 134. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S 
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 17 (2002). 
 135.  Tribunal de Grande Instance De Paris [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, Ordonnance de refere, UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, available at http:// 
ww.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm.  
 136. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 
(N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 137. For discussion of the merits, see Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 104, at 
1877–79. 
 138. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
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else that recognizes the French judgment, it will need to comply with the 
French ruling, regardless of U.S. judicial or governmental declarations. 
Indeed, given Yahoo!’s professed desire to build a company with a “global 
footprint,”139 it is not surprising that the company “voluntarily” complied 
with the French order,140 while still continuing to challenge its legitimacy. 
Even from a governmental perspective, the United States would need to 
step gingerly lest other countries begin to refuse to enforce U.S. judgments, 
thus impeding U.S. regulatory interests. The reality of global commercial 
activity means that simply refusing to pay attention to the regulatory 
decisions of other countries is not feasible. 
Moreover, there will be many occasions when a pure territorialist 
scheme will thwart U.S. regulatory interests. For example, the federal 
government has doggedly pursued efforts to shut down and/or prosecute 
Internet sites operating from foreign locations that send unsolicited 
commercial e-mail, offer online gambling, distribute child pornography, 
and disseminate online viruses, among others.141 Adhering to a regulatory 
environment that reifies territory will tend to hinder such efforts. Antitrust 
and securities regulation pose other prominent examples.142 
What about the decisions of international bodies? Recall the NAFTA 
ruling that Mississippi courts had violated international standards of due 
process in adjudicating a dispute between a U.S. and a Canadian 
company.143 While such a ruling has no binding authority on Mississippi, 
will Mississippi simply ignore it in future cases raising similar issues? 
Probably not. First, although the NAFTA panel cannot literally overrule 
Mississippi civil procedure, it can assess fines against the federal 
government,144 which in turn can put pressure on the states to change their 
policies. And though the United States could, theoretically, simply refuse to 
 
 139. See Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Reports Fourth Quarter, Year End 2000 Financial 
Results (Jan. 10, 2001), at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/4q00pr.html (stating that Yahoo! “remained 
committed to broadening its global footprint and maintaining a leadership position worldwide”). 
 140. See Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Enhances Commerce Sites for Higher Quality Online 
Experience (Jan. 2, 2001), at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release675.html (announcing new product 
guidelines for its auction sites that prohibit “items that are associated with groups deemed to promote or 
glorify hatred and violence”). 
 141. See, e.g., The FBI’s Cyber Division: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet 
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Jana D. 
Monroe, Asst. Dir., Cyber Division, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/Monroe 
071703.htm (detailing such efforts). 
 142. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (limiting the 
extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act). 
 143. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.  
 144. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1135, Jan. 1, 1994, 107 
Stat. 2057 (outlining remedies available).  
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pay, such an action would effectively scuttle NAFTA itself, to the 
detriment of U.S. business interests. Second, Mississippi may face 
economic hardship if Canadian and Mexican businesses refuse to locate 
there for fear of being sued on a tilted playing field. Thus, there may also 
be internal pressure to modify local practices. Third, perhaps more 
speculatively, it is difficult to believe as a matter of legal consciousness 
that Mississippi judges could be completely unaffected by a judicial ruling 
that they violated international due process standards, even if that judicial 
ruling were issued in a distant location. Such effects are likely to increase 
as international and domestic judges interact more, both in formal and 
informal settings.145 After all, if one actually knows the judges leveling the 
criticism or will need to face them in social settings in the near future, it 
becomes that much harder to ignore their disapprobation. 
Finally, one might think it easier to ignore the rules or decisions of 
non-state actors who probably have the least leverage over official 
governmental policy. But even here, a refusal to recognize or accept other 
normative communities may be impossible. After all, what would it mean 
for even a powerful state to refuse to recognize the quasi-legal norms 
articulated and enforced through yearly meetings of a small group of 
international trade finance bankers?146 The bankers will meet regardless of 
U.S. pronouncements, they will still set rules for trade finance, and U.S. 
bankers will continue to comply with those rules, at least if they want to be 
part of the global marketplace. The objection of a nation-state is therefore 
largely irrelevant. 
Of course, there are many times when a nation-state can ignore the 
wishes of foreign regulatory entities, particularly if there is a great disparity 
of wealth or power in the relationship among the entities. For example, the 
Bush administration has defied international law and opinion in its 
continued worldwide detention and rendition practices.147 But even such 
defiance has not been without substantial consequences. Thus, it may 
become more difficult to achieve security in Iraq,148 get cooperation from 
 
 145. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000) 
(describing potential impact of such interactions). 
 146. For a discussion of the creation of these banking norms, see Levit, supra note 27. 
 147. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition 
Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 309–11 (2006) (summarizing the detention 
and rendition policies and international reaction). 
 148. See, e.g., Scott Wilson & Sewell Chan, As Inusrgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2004, at A1 (stating that Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, spokesman for the U.S. 
military in Iraq, acknowledged that “the evidence of abuse inside Abu Ghraib has shaken public opinion 
in Iraq to the point where it may be more difficult than ever to secure cooperation against the 
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potential allies in tracking down and extraditing terrorism suspects,149 or 
use moral suasion to convince repressive governments to obey human 
rights norms,150 among many other consequences. And that is not even 
counting the possibility that other countries may attempt to initiate 
prosecutions against U.S. government operatives who engaged in such 
controversial practices.151 In short, if one wants to be a player on the world 
geopolitical scene and wishes to secure a favorable climate for one’s own 
business interests in the world, it will be difficult to insist on pure 
sovereignty-based territorialist prerogatives for long. And, of course, 
countries with less military or economic power will tend to be even more 
buffeted by the activities of international, foreign, and non-state entities 
physically dispersed around the globe. 
B.  UNIVERSALISM 
In contrast to a reassertion of territorial prerogative, a universalist 
vision tends to respond to normative conflict by seeking to erase normative 
difference altogether.152 Indeed, international legal theory has long yearned 
for an overarching set of commitments that would establish a more 
peaceful and harmonious global community.153 More recently, some have 
 
insurgency. . . . [and] that winning over Iraqis before the planned handover of some sovereign powers 
next month had been made considerably harder by the photos”). 
 149. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military 
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1450 (2002) 
(discussing the reluctance of some nations to cooperate with the United States due to their perceptions 
of the illegitimacy of the use of military tribunals); Craig Whitlock, Testimony Helps Detail CIA’s Post-
9/11 Reach: Europeans Told of Plans for Abductions, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at A1 (quoting State 
Department legal adviser John B. Bellinger III’s statement that ongoing disputes with U.S. allies about 
detention practices have “undermined cooperation and intelligence activities”). 
 150. For a discussion of how U.S. practices have undermined American effectiveness in 
promoting human rights abroad, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2004), 
rev’d, 415 F.3d 33, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE 
NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES (2003)), and 
DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN & PRITI PATEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BEHIND THE WIRE: AN UPDATE TO 
ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS (2005). See also Brief of Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (filed by former 
U.S. diplomats, making this argument). 
 151. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson & Maria De Cristofaro, Italy Indicts 33 in Abduction Case; 26 
Americans Charged in Alleged CIA Rendition, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2007, at 11, available at 2007 
WLNR 3186956 (Westlaw NewsRoom). 
 152. It is, perhaps, possible to have a universalist vision that focuses exclusively on developing 
overarching procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing hybridity. Indeed, one 
might see the effort to construct global administrative law principles as an initiative along these lines. 
See, e.g., Krisch, supra note 87. That sort of universalism would, of course, be more compatible with 
the pluralist perspective offered in this Article.  
 153. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Helen O’Brien trans., Grotius Soc’y Publ’ns 
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suggested that the nation-state legal regimes of the world are increasingly 
converging and developing a “world law.”154 This supposed new world 
order variously focuses on the religiously-based natural law principles of 
international human rights or the neoliberal ideology of free trade and its 
need to harmonize rules that regulate commerce. 
As with territorialism, one cannot discount the importance of 
universalism. Certainly since World War II we have seen the creation of a 
dizzying array of international institutions, multilateral and bilateral 
treaties, conventions, cross-border regulatory coordination efforts, and the 
like. In one way or another, all of this activity represents the desire to 
harmonize conflicting norms. And on many fronts, both in public and 
private law, norms are in fact converging to a degree, whether through 
hegemonic imposition or global embrace. Moreover, such harmonization 
has important benefits because it tends to lower transaction costs and 
uncertainty as to what norms will be applied to any given activity. Yet, 
again as with territorialism, there are reasons to question both the 
desirability and—more importantly—the feasibility of universalism, at 
least in some contexts. 
As to desirability, it is not at all clear that universalism is an unalloyed 
good. Indeed, if we think of ourselves solely as citizens of the world, we 
might tend to dissolve the multirootedness of community affiliation into 
one global community. Thus, universalism may fail to capture the extreme 
emotional ties people still feel to distinct transnational or local 
communities155 and therefore ignore the very attachments people hold most 
deeply. 
In addition, universalism inevitably erases diversity. This is a problem 
for three reasons. First, such erasure may involve the silencing of less 
powerful voices. Thus, the presumed universal may also be the hegemonic. 
Second, preserving legal diversity can be seen as a good in and of itself 
because it means that multiple forms of regulatory authority can be assayed 
in multiple local settings. Just as states in a federal system function as 
 
1927) (1795). 
 154. See, e.g., Berman, World Law, supra note 40. See also Harold J. Berman, Is Conflict of Laws 
Becoming Passé? An Historical Response 44 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-42, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=870455 (“[W]ill 
increasing harmonization of the civil and criminal law of the nation-states of the world substantially 
reduce the scope of that branch of law that we call conflict-of-laws?”). 
 155. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law 
and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 374 (1996) (“The powerful pull of loyalty exerted by the 
imagined nation demonstrates that, even in the age of science, a loyalty system based on romantic 
myths of shared history and kinship has a capacity to endure . . . .”). 
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“laboratories” of innovation,156 so too the preservation of diverse legal 
spaces makes innovation possible. Third, a legal system that provides 
mechanisms for mediating diversity without dissolving difference 
necessarily also provides an important model for mediating diversity in 
day-to-day social life. For example, one argument for a strongly speech-
protective interpretation of the First Amendment is that the effort required 
to tolerate the provocative speech of others is the same effort required to 
tolerate others more generally.157 Thus, a legal system that demands 
tolerance of diversity rather than its erasure is more likely to create the 
context for a tolerant society than one that, in contrast, seeks uniformity as 
its goal. 
Nevertheless, even if one rejects these normative arguments and 
embraces universalism as a goal, it is difficult to believe that, as a practical 
matter, harmonization processes will ever fully bridge the significant 
differences that exist among states, let alone the variety of non-state orders 
at play in the world. This is because many differences both in substantive 
values and attitudes about law arise from fundamentally different histories, 
philosophies, and worldviews. People are therefore likely to be either 
unable or unwilling to trade in their perspectives for the sake of universal 
harmony. Moreover, even if they were so inclined, it would be difficult to 
develop a process for determining which norms should be elevated to 
universal status and which should give way. Thus, when harmonization is 
possible, it is usually a slow, laborious undertaking, limited to codifying 
normative convergences that have already occurred over time. As a result, 
harmonization is generally backward-looking, and in a rapidly-changing 
world, harmonization processes will tend to lag behind social, 
technological, and economic realities.158 Accordingly, even the most 
optimistic universalist would have to acknowledge that normative conflict 
is at the very least a constant transitional reality that will require hybrid 
processes to address. 
 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–81 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he theory and utility of our federalism are revealed” when “considerable disagreement exists about 
how best to accomplish [a] goal” because “the States may perform their role as laboratories for 
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”). 
 157. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 
(1966) (arguing that free speech “contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, 
skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It spurns the alternative 
of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant. It is this concept of society that was 
embodied in the first amendment”). 
 158. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15, at 569 (bemoaning the lack of dynamism in classical public 
international lawmaking and advocating an alternative approach to mediating legal diversity). 
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C.  PLURALISM 
Although sovereigntist territorialism and universalism are obviously 
different strategies, they both represent a retreat from hybridity. Of course, 
as noted previously, sometimes such a rejection of hybridity may be 
deemed necessary. Yet, hybridity is difficult to escape in a world of 
overlapping jurisdictions and normative diversity, where—as the pluralists 
would say—multiple conflicting legal systems occupy the same social 
field. The question therefore often becomes: are there other approaches to 
managing hybridity? And though the next Part surveys a range of specific 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices for doing so, 
here I briefly outline some principles that would underlie a more pluralist 
approach. 
First, as should be obvious by now, a pluralist approach to managing 
hybridity should not attempt to erase the reality of that hybridity. Indeed, 
arguably the desire to “solve” hybridity problems is precisely what has 
made conflict of laws such a conceptually dissatisfying field for so long. 
Each generation seeks a new way (or often the revival of an old way) to 
divine an answer to what is at its root an unanswerable question: which 
territorially-based state community’s norms should govern a dispute that, 
by definition, is not easily situated territorially and necessarily involves 
affiliations with multiple communities? 
Second, and relatedly, a pluralist framework recognizes that normative 
conflict is unavoidable and so, instead of trying to erase conflict, seeks to 
manage it through procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that 
might at least draw the participants to the conflict into a shared social 
space. This approach draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that agreements 
are reached principally through participation in common forms of life, 
rather than agreement on substance.159 Or, as political theorist Chantal 
Mouffe has put it, we need to transform “enemies”—who have no common 
symbolic space—into “adversaries.”160 Adversaries, according to Mouffe 
are “friendly enemies”: friends because they “share a common symbolic 
space but also enemies because they want to organize this common 
symbolic space in a different way.”161 Ideally, law—and particularly legal 
mechanisms for managing hybridity—can function as the sort of common 
symbolic space that Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a constructive 
 
 159. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 241 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 
3d ed. 1958). 
 160. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000). 
 161. Id. 
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role in transforming enemies into adversaries. 
Of course, Mouffe might well disagree with my application of her idea 
to law. Indeed, in The Democratic Paradox, she writes that “one cannot 
oppose, as so many liberals do, procedural and substantial justice without 
recognizing that procedural justice already presupposes acceptance of 
certain values.”162 Her point is well-taken; certainly my focus on 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices necessarily limits the 
range of pluralism somewhat because it requires participants to accept the 
principles underlying the values of procedural pluralism itself. This is, to a 
large extent, a vision consonant with liberal principles, and many may 
reject it on that basis. Alas, there is no way to extricate oneself from this 
concern if one wants to have any type of functioning legal system for 
negotiating normative difference. Thus, I argue only that a pluralist 
framework is more likely able to bring participants together into a common 
social space than a territorialist or universalist framework would. As 
philosopher Stuart Hampshire has argued, because normative agreement is 
impossible, “fairness and justice in procedures” are the only virtues that 
offer even the possibility for broader sharing.163 Accordingly, the key is to 
create spaces for such broader sharing, spaces for turning enemies into 
adversaries, without insisting on normative agreement.164 
Third, in order to help create this sort of shared social space, 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing hybridity 
should encourage decision makers to wrestle explicitly with questions of 
multiple community affiliation and the effects of activities across territorial 
borders, rather than shunting aside normative difference. As a result, a 
pluralist framework invites questions that otherwise might not be asked: 
How are communities appropriately defined in today’s world? To what 
degree do people act based on affiliations with non-state or supranational 
communities? How should the various norm-generating communities in the 
global system interact so as to provide opportunities for contestation and 
expression of difference? Such questions must be considered carefully in 
order to develop mechanisms that will take seriously the multifaceted 
interactions of such communities. 
Fourth, thinking in more pluralist terms forces consideration of so-
 
 162. Id. at 68. 
 163. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 53 (2000). 
 164. Cf. Waldron, supra note 47 (manuscript at 6) (“Humans are enormously curious about each 
other’s ideas and reasons, and, when they want to be, they are resourceful in listening to and trying to 
learn from one another across what appear to be insurmountable barriers of cultural comprehensibility, 
often far beyond what philosophers and theorists of culture give them credit for.”). 
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called “conflicts values,” particularly the independent benefit that may 
accrue when domestic judicial and regulatory decisions take into account a 
broader interest in a smoothly functioning overlapping international legal 
order, reflecting what Justice Blackmun called “the systemic value of 
reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.”165 For example, U.S. courts give full 
faith and credit to judgments rendered in other states even if those 
judgments would be illegal if issued by the crediting state.166 Thus, the 
conflicts value of respecting an interlocking national system outweighs 
individual parochial interests. And though the domestic example is made 
easier by the existence of a constitutional command,167 such considerations 
should always be part of any mechanism for addressing the overlap of 
plural legal systems. Moreover, taking account of these sorts of systemic 
values should be seen as a necessary part of how communities pursue their 
interests in the world, not as a restraint on pursuing such interests. After all, 
if it is true that communities cannot exist in isolation from each other, then 
there is a long-term parochial benefit from not insisting on narrow 
parochial interest and instead establishing mechanisms for trying to defer to 
others’ norms where possible. 
Fifth, even a system that respects conflicts values will, of course, 
sometimes find a foreign law so anathema that the law will not be enforced. 
Or a local religious practice may be so contrary to state values that it will 
be deemed illegal. Or creating a zone of autonomy for a particular minority 
group might so threaten the stability of the larger community that it cannot 
be countenanced. Thus, embracing pluralism in no way requires a full 
embrace of illiberal communities and practices or the recognition of 
autonomy rights for every minority group across the board. But when such 
“public policy” exceptions are invoked within a pluralist framework, they 
should be treated as unusual occasions requiring strong normative 
 
 165. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 166. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause “ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, 
because the practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it”). 
See also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this 
Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of another state, although the forum would not 
be required to entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded . . . .”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 
U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (stating that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit 
in Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). 
 167. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). 
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statements regarding the contours of the public policy.168 This means that, 
as Robert Cover envisioned, a jurispathic act that “kills off” another 
community’s normative commitment169 is always at least accompanied by 
an equally strong normative commitment. The key point is to make 
decision makers self-conscious about their necessary jurispathic actions.170 
Only such an approach has any chance of keeping adversaries from turning 
into enemies.171 
Finally, a pluralist framework must always be understood as a middle 
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and universalism on 
the other. The key, therefore, is to try to articulate and maintain a balance 
between these two poles. As such, successful mechanisms, institutions, or 
practices will be those that simultaneously celebrate both local variation 
and international order, and recognize the importance of preserving both 
multiple sites for contestation and an interlocking system of reciprocity and 
exchange. Of course, actually doing that in difficult cases is a Herculean 
and perhaps impossible task. Certainly, mutual agreement about contested 
normative issues is unlikely and, as discussed previously, possibly even 
undesirable. Thus, the challenge is to develop ways to seek mutual 
accommodation while keeping at least some “play” in the joints so that 
diversity is respected as much as possible. Such play in the joints also 
allows for the jurisgenerative possibilities inherent in having multiple 
lawmaking communities and multiple norms.172 Always the focus is on 
trying to forge the sort of shared social space that Mouffe describes for 
transforming enemies into adversaries. 
Taken together, these principles provide a set of criteria for evaluating 
the ways in which legal systems interact. In addition, the principles could 
inform a community (whether state-based or not) that wishes to design 
mechanisms, institutions, or practices for addressing hybrid assertions of 
norms. Of course, such criteria are not exclusive. For example, a procedure 
or practice that manages hybridity well but denies certain norms of 
 
 168. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (requiring courts to enforce the judgment or arbitral award 
unless there is fraud or if doing so would be repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing forum). 
 169. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 1, at 53 (describing judges as inevitably 
“people of violence” because their interpretations “kill” off competing normative assertions). 
 170. Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert 
Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 25 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Legal Commitments] (“[Cover] 
wanted the state’s actors . . . to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of 
the legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that multiple meanings and 
divergent practices ought sometimes to be tolerated, even if painfully so.”).  
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 160–62. 
 172. See supra note 46. 
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fundamental justice might be deemed problematic, regardless of its 
embrace of hybridity. Thus, my goal is not to say that embracing pluralism 
always overrides other concerns. After all, as mentioned previously, many 
legal and quasi-legal orders are repressive and profoundly illiberal, and 
their norms may be resisted on other grounds. Instead, the important point 
is simply that pluralist questions should always at least be part of the 
debate. In order to see what this would entail, the next Part surveys a broad 
range of jurisdictional, regulatory, institutional, and doctrinal arrangements 
that are not usually grouped together and that are not usually evaluated 
based on the criteria set forth above. Nevertheless, despite the very 
different doctrinal contexts in which these mechanisms, institutions, and 
practices arise, they can usefully be understood and evaluated as 
approaches to the management of hybridity. 
IV.  PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS, 
AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES FOR MANAGING HYBRIDITY 
 Given the reality of hybridity, we should not be at all surprised to find, 
across a wide variety of doctrinal areas, the development of procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices that attempt to manage 
the overlapping of legal or quasi-legal communities. In this Part, I survey 
nine such mechanisms, institutions, and practices. Each has been the 
subject of scholarship (sometimes voluminous) in its own right, but they 
have not, to date, been viewed collectively, nor have they, for the most 
part, been considered through a pluralist lens. Indeed, just thinking of them 
as mechanisms for managing hybridity may offer a different perspective on 
their efficacy or functionality. For example, these mechanisms, institutions, 
and practices are often the product of necessary political compromise 
between sovereigntist territorialism and universalism, and they are 
therefore deemed “half a loaf” solutions by advocates on both sides: less 
attractive than what they were hoping for, but better than nothing. Viewing 
such mechanisms, institutions, and practices through a pluralist lens, 
however, might cause us to consider whether they are not, instead, “loaf-
and-a-half” solutions which, through their compromises, actually result in a 
better set of procedures for managing hybridity than if either sovereigntist 
territorialism or universalism had prevailed in toto. In any event, though I 
provide no more than brief summaries here, I believe that, taken together, 
these examples demonstrate the importance of global legal pluralism as an 
intellectual framework for studying law and globalization in the twenty-
first century. 
One point is necessary before proceeding, however. Describing 
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mechanisms for managing hybridity does not tell us how best to actually 
manage hybridity in particular cases. Thus, each of the mechanisms 
described in this Part encounter excruciatingly difficult and probably 
impossible to resolve problems as to how best to determine when norms of 
one community should give way to norms of another and when, in contrast, 
pluralism can be maintained. This sort of line-drawing question can never 
be resolved definitively or satisfactorily because there is at root level no 
way to “solve” problems of hybridity; the debates are ongoing. But in any 
event it is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest solutions to specific 
cases of plural conflict. Instead, I argue that creating (or preserving) 
mechanisms, institutions, and practices that self-consciously acknowledge 
the reality of hybridity and seek provisional compromises may sometimes 
be the best we can do. In addition, simply recognizing the importance of 
these mechanisms as sites for continuing debates about hybridity, legal 
conflicts, and mutual accommodation is a crucial first step. 
A.  DIALECTICAL LEGAL INTERACTIONS 
Some who study international law fail to find real “law” there because 
they are looking for hierarchically-based commands backed by coercive 
power.173 In contrast, a pluralist approach understands that interactions 
between various tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely to take 
on a dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review 
traditionally undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue that 
often occurs under the doctrine of comity.174 In the international context, 
for example, we may see treaty-based courts exert an important influence 
even as national courts retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal 
courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction may well influence state court 
interpretations of U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases.175 In turn, the 
decisions of national courts may also come to influence international 
tribunals. This dialectical and iterative process,176 if it emerges, will exist 
without an official hierarchical relationship based on coercive power. 
Three examples illustrate the point. First, of course, is the relationship 
between NAFTA panels and U.S. state courts discussed previously. In 
 
 173. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 
(2005). 
 174. For a detailed analysis of such dialectical regulation, see Ahdieh, supra note 21. 
 175. See id. at 2034. 
 176. See BENHABIB, supra note 46, at 48 (“Every iteration involves making sense of an 
authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is reposited and resignified 
via subsequent usages and references.”). 
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Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, a NAFTA tribunal reviewed the 
procedures of the Mississippi courts concerning contract and antitrust 
claims brought by a local entity against a Canadian corporation.177 The 
tribunal criticized the trial as “so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of 
justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in 
international law.”178 In addition, the tribunal criticized the $400 million 
punitive damages award issued by the trial court as “grossly 
disproportionate” to the damage actually suffered.179 And while in the end 
the NAFTA panel refrained (on standing grounds) from assessing damages 
against the United States,180 there is little reason to think that liability in 
similar situations could not be imposed in the future. 
Thus, the question becomes: how will a domestic court, faced with a 
new multinational dispute, respond both to the NAFTA precedents already 
in place and the threat of possible NAFTA panel review? Although these 
NAFTA panels lack formal authority over the domestic courts they review, 
they do have the power to assess damages against federal authorities for 
violations of the trade agreement,181 even if those violations occurred in the 
context of a domestic court judgment. Thus, we see plural sources of 
normative authority: the domestic court that issued an initial judgment, the 
NAFTA tribunal that reviews this judgment for fidelity with the principles 
of the treaty, and the federal authorities who, in response to pressure from 
the NAFTA tribunal, may in turn put pressure on the domestic court. 
Robert Ahdieh has argued that, given these realities, we are likely to see, 
over time, a dialectical relationship form between the domestic and 
international tribunals, in which both courts pay attention to each other’s 
interpretations and, while not literally bound by each other’s decisions, 
develop a joint jurisprudence partly in tandem and partly in tension with 
each other.182 
In order to see how such a dialectical relationship might evolve, 
consider interactions between the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) and the constitutional courts of European member states. Here, 
the relationship may seem more hierarchical because, over the past several 
decades, the ECHR has increasingly come to seem like a supranational 
constitutional court, and its authority as ultimate arbiter of European human 
 
 177. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.  
 178. Id. ¶ 54. 
 179. Id. ¶ 113. 
 180. See id. ¶¶ 238–40. 
 181. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Ahdieh, supra note 21. 
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rights disputes has largely been accepted.183 Yet, even in this context there 
appears to be room for hybridity. As Nico Krisch has documented, 
domestic courts occasionally fail to follow ECHR judgments, asserting 
fundamental principles embedded in their own constitutional order, and in 
general claiming the power to determine the ultimate limits to be placed on 
the authority of the ECHR.184 Typical of this dialectical relationship is the 
statement by the German constitutional court that ECHR judgments have to 
be “taken into account” by German courts, but may have to be “integrated” 
or adapted to fit the domestic legal system.185 Moreover, the German court 
has gone so far as to say that ECHR decisions must be disregarded 
altogether if they are “contrary to German constitutional provisions.”186 
Yet, although such statements make it sound as if conflict between the 
ECHR and domestic courts is the norm, the reality has actually been quite 
harmonious. As Krisch points out, “despite national courts’ insistence on 
their final authority, the normal, day-to-day operation of the relationship 
with the [ECHR] has lately been highly cooperative, and friction has been 
rare.”187 The picture that emerges is one in which domestic courts and the 
ECHR engage in a series of both informal and interpretive mutual 
accommodation strategies to maintain a balance between uniformity and 
dissension. This dialectical relationship, forged and developed over many 
years, may well reflect the path yet to be taken by the NAFTA tribunals 
and domestic courts, as well as the many other intersystemic interactions at 
play in the world today. 
Finally, consider the Canadian Constitution, which explicitly 
contemplates a dialectical interaction between national courts and 
provincial legislatures concerning constitutional interpretation. Section 33’s 
so-called “notwithstanding clause” permits Parliament or a provincial 
legislature to authorize the operation of a law for a five-year period, even 
after it has been declared invalid by a court.188 As with the ECHR example, 
this provision potentially has a disciplining effect on the court and 
encourages a more nuanced iterative process in working out constitutional 
norms. It is true of course that the notwithstanding clause, though often 
invoked rhetorically, has only rarely actually been used by provincial 
 
 183. See Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law 2 (2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 184. See generally id. 
 185. Id. at 19. 
 186. Id. (citation omitted). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 33 (U.K.). 
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governments to continue a judicially invalidated law.189 Yet, this relative 
infrequency of use may not be evidence of a failed constitutional 
innovation. Instead, it may indicate just the opposite: that the various 
institutional actors have sufficiently internalized this mechanism for 
managing hybridity such that, as in the ECHR example, the precipice is 
rarely reached.190 
In contrast to the dialectical interplay contemplated by the 
notwithstanding clause, the United States Supreme Court has, on multiple 
occasions, interpreted the U.S. Constitution to contain an implicit foreign 
affairs preemption doctrine that cuts off such interplay.191 Thus, in three 
different cases, the Court has refused to allow localities to take actions that 
were deemed to trench on the exclusive national prerogative to conduct 
foreign affairs. Yet, one might think that, “[i]n our democratic federation, 
local efforts to effectuate protection of rights have a presumptive validity 
authorized by the commitments to multiple voices protected in a federal 
system.”192 At the very least, courts should carefully interrogate the 
claimed justification of preemption to ensure that the local action at issue 
poses a real, rather than conjectural, threat to the federal government’s 
conduct.193 After all, pluralism is built into the structure of federalism, and 
 
 189. For example, the Quebec Parliament overrode the Canadian Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
provisions of a language law. See Ford v. Quebec, [1988] S.C.R. 712. Outside of Quebec, however, the 
notwithstanding clause has never been used to overturn a judicial decision. See James Allan & Grant 
Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21 (2006). In addition, according to one account, the clause has been 
disavowed by successive Prime Ministers because “[i]ts use has come to be seen as undermining the 
Charter, in part because judicial decisions interpreting the Charter have come to be seen as synonymous 
with the Charter itself.” Id. at 20. 
 190. On the other hand, it is possible that “the notwithstanding clause frees Canadian courts to be 
less deferential to elected legislatures than they otherwise would have been in the absence of such a 
clause, because it allows judges to act on the basis that their decisions are not final.” Allan & Huscroft, 
supra note 189, at 21–22. In any event, the important point for this Article is that the clause is 
structured as a mechanism for managing the hybridity of multiple communities within a federal system. 
For an account supporting the approach of the notwithstanding clause from the perspective of political 
theory, see Jennifer Nedelski, Reconceiving Rights and Constitutionalism (2007) (unpublished chapter 
of manuscript, on file with author). 
 191. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down California law 
requiring insurance companies doing business in California to disclose any business activities in Europe 
during the Nazi Holocaust); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (prohibiting 
Massachusetts from banning state expenditures on imports made with forced labor); Zschernig v. 
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down Oregon statute that had the effect of preventing a resident of 
East Germany from inheriting property probated in the state). For a discussion of these cases, see 
Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 79–85).  
 192. Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 111 (manuscript at 92–93). 
 193. See id. (manuscript at 94) (“Judges ought to adopt a posture of non-encroachment by 
insisting on exacting evidence of particular and specific imminent harms before invalidating actions by 
localities or states as they determine their own expenditures of funds and rules.”). 
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so actions of localities to import international or foreign norms or signal 
solidarity with them should not easily be displaced. 
These examples all involve dialectical interactions between formal 
state or international legal institutions; however, the same dialectical 
interactions are possible with regard to non-state normative standards. For 
example, the decisions of arbitral panels may, over time, come to exert 
influence on the decisions of more formal state or international bodies, and 
vice versa. In a different context, states may incorporate or adapt standards 
of conduct that are part of accreditation schemes promulgated by NGOs or 
industry groups.194 And more broadly, we might see the creation of 
monitoring schemes in general as a kind of pluralist approach because 
instead of dictating rules, such monitoring generates oversight and 
publicity that can instigate change without a formal hierarchical 
relationship or coercive enforcement mechanism. 
B.  MARGINS OF APPRECIATION 
One of the interpretive mechanisms employed by the ECHR to 
maintain space for local variation is the oft-discussed “margin of 
appreciation” doctrine.195 The idea here is to strike a balance between 
deference to national courts and legislators on the one hand, and 
maintaining “European supervision” that “empower[s the ECHR] to give 
the final ruling” on whether a challenged practice is compatible with the 
Convention, on the other.196 Thus, the margin of appreciation allows 
domestic polities some room to maneuver in implementing ECHR 
decisions in order to accommodate local variation. How big that margin is 
depends on a number of factors including, for example, the degree of 
consensus among the member states. Thus, in a case involving parental 
rights of transsexuals, the ECHR noted that because there was as yet no 
common European standard and “generally speaking, the law appears to be 
in a transitional stage, the respondent State must be afforded a wide margin 
of appreciation.”197 
 
 194. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
618–19 (2000) (describing government incorporation of accreditation standards on Health Maintenance 
Organizations first promulgated by a not-for-profit entity). See also LAURA A. DICKINSON, 
OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE (forthcoming 2008) (proposing such an accreditation scheme for 
disciplining private military contractors). 
 195. A particularly useful, succinct summary can be found in Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316–17 
(1997). My discussion here largely tracks theirs. 
 196. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1979). 
 197. X v. United Kingdom, No. 75/1995/581/667, slip op. at 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 22, 1997) 
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Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully 
accommodates a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic 
courts to fully ignore the supranational pronouncement (though, as 
discussed above, domestic courts have sometimes asserted greater 
independence198). Nevertheless, it does allow space for local variation, 
particularly when the law is in transition or when no consensus exists 
among member states on a given issue. Moreover, by framing the inquiry 
as one of local consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine disciplines 
the ECHR and forces it to move incrementally, pushing toward consensus 
without running too far ahead of it. Finally, the margin of appreciation 
functions as a signaling mechanism, through which “the ECHR is able to 
identify potentially problematic practices for the contracting states before 
they actually become violations, thereby permitting the states to anticipate 
that their laws may one day be called into question.”199 And, of course, 
there is reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their societal 
evolution away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local 
variation. As Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have observed, 
“The conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the consensus 
inquiry thus permits the ECHR to link its decisions to the pace of change of 
domestic law, acknowledging the political sovereignty of respondent states 
while legitimizing its own decisions against them.”200 A similar sort of 
interaction could be established by a constitutional court adopting some 
form of the classic concept/conception distinction201 with regard to the 
adoption of norms by other actors. Thus, an entity such as the ECHR could, 
for example, articulate a particular concept of rights, while recognizing that 
the way this right is implemented is subject to various alternative 
conceptions. 
 
(citations omitted). See also Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1994) 
(finding that the lack of a uniform European conception of rights to freedom of expression “directed 
against religious feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation). 
 198. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 199. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 195, at 317. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, 
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 141 (1993). 
For an example of this type of signaling, see J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2d ed. 1993) (interpreting the ECHR’s 
statement in Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986), that “‘[t]he need for 
appropriate legal measures [to protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept under review having 
regard particularly to scientific and societal developments’” as a “strong hint that while British practice 
currently satisfied [the Convention], the Court’s duty to interpret the Convention as a living instrument 
may lead it to a different conclusion in the future”). 
 200. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 195, at 317. 
 201. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the difference between 
“concept” and “conception” as “a contrast between levels of abstraction at which the interpretation of 
the practice can be studied”). 
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Other legal regimes could also usefully adopt margins of appreciation. 
For example, the controversial agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights could be interpreted to incorporate a margin of 
appreciation. Such a flexible approach might allow developing countries 
more leeway in trying to make sure that access to knowledge in their 
countries is not unduly thwarted by overly stringent intellectual property 
protection. 
C.  LIMITED AUTONOMY REGIMES 
A different kind of margin of appreciation problem involves the 
interactions between state and non-state law. Here, as with the 
supranational/national dialectic, we have two different normative orders 
that can neither ignore nor eliminate the other. Thus, the question becomes 
what mechanisms of pluralism can be created to mediate the conflicts? As 
noted previously, this problem classically arises in the context of religion 
or ethnicity, though it is in no way limited to such communities. 
Nevertheless, an overview of mechanisms for managing religious and 
ethnic (or linguistic-group) hybridity may shed light on the possibility of 
building institutions to address non-state normative communities in a 
variety of settings. 
In a useful summary, Henry Steiner has delineated three distinct types 
of autonomy regime.202 The first allows a territorially-concentrated ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minority group limited autonomy within the nation-
state.203 The precise contours of this autonomy can vary considerably from 
situation to situation; however, such schemes can include the creation of 
regional elective governments, command of local police, control over 
natural resources, management of regional schools, and so on.204 With 
regard to language, communities may be empowered to create language 
rights within their regions.205 
 
 202. See Steiner, supra note 25, at 1541–43. 
 203. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 156 (2001) (arguing that the creation of linguistically 
homogeneous, separate institutions for minority subgroups within a larger federal structure will foster 
the participation of minority groups in democracy by giving them the autonomy to control cultural 
policy). 
 204. See Steiner, supra note 25, at 1541–42 (listing examples). 
 205. See, e.g., Wouter Pas, A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case of 
Belgium, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 157, 158–59 (G. 
Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams & Josef Marko eds., 2004) (“[I]n 1970 the Belgian State was divided into 
four territorial linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual 
region of Brussels-Capital, and the German-speaking region. . . . The authorities in each region may, in 
principle, only use the official language of that region in their dealings with citizens. In some 
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Of course, non-state normative communities are often dispersed 
throughout a state, making it difficult to create specific local zones of 
autonomy. In such cases, other potential autonomy regimes may be more 
effective.206 A second possibility, therefore, involves direct power-sharing 
arrangements.207 “Such regimes carve up a state’s population in ethnic 
terms to assure one or several ethnic groups of a particular form of 
participation in governance or economic opportunities.”208 Thus, we may 
see provisions that set aside a fixed number of legislative seats, executive 
branch positions, or judicial appointments to a particular religious or ethnic 
minority group.209 In addition, legislators who are members of a particular 
minority group may be granted the ability to veto proposed measures 
adversely affecting that group.210 Alternatively, states may enact rules 
requiring formal consultation before decisions are taken on issues that 
particularly impact minority communities.211 
Finally, a third autonomy regime contemplates the reality that 
members of an ethnic community may invoke the idea of a personal law 
that is carried with the individual, regardless of territorial location. This 
personal law is often religious in character and it reflects a primary 
identification with one’s religious or ethnic group, rather than the 
territorially delimited community of the nation-state.212 Accordingly, state 
law may seek to create what are essentially margins of appreciation to 
recognize forms of autonomy for these identities.213 “Like power sharing, a 
personal law can provide an important degree of autonomy and cohesion 
even for minorities that are territorially dispersed.”214 
The question of accommodation to personal law is not a new one, nor 
 
municipalities, where a significant number of the inhabitants speak another language, special provisions 
were enacted to give individuals the right to continue to use their own language in their relations with 
the local authorities.”). 
 206. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 744 
(2006) (“Devolution to minority-run institutions will not help secure rights for disparate ethnic groups 
spread out over a nation’s territory . . . .”). 
 207. See, e.g., Ivo D. Duchacek, Federalist Responses to Ethnic Demands: An Overview, in 
FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION 59 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1979); Arend Lijphart, The Power-
Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 491 (Joseph V. 
Montville ed., 1990). 
 208. Steiner, supra note 25, at 1541. 
 209. Id. at 1541–42. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1542. 
 212. See, e.g., Mallat, supra note 24, at 47 (contrasting the “personal model” with the “territorial 
model”). 
 213. Chibli Mallat calls this scheme “‘communitarian’ (or personal) federalism.” Id. at 51. 
 214. Steiner, supra note 25, at 1542. 
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is it limited to religious groups. In ancient Egypt, foreign merchants in 
commercial disputes were sometimes permitted to choose judges of their 
own nationality so that foreigners could settle their dispute “in accordance 
with their own foreign laws and customs.”215 Greek city-states adopted 
similar rules.216 Later, legal systems in England and continental Europe 
applied personal law to foreign litigants, judging many criminal and civil 
matters based not on the territorial location of the actors, but on their 
citizenship.217 In the ninth century, for example, King Edgar allowed Danes 
to be judged by the laws of their homeland.218 Likewise, William the 
Conqueror granted eleventh-century French immigrants the right to be 
judged by rules based on their national identity.219 Foreign merchants 
trading under King John, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were 
similarly governed by the law of their home communities.220 
As noted previously, the relationship between state and personal law 
frequently arose in colonial settings where western legal systems were 
layered on top of the personal laws and customs of indigenous 
communities.221 Indeed, in the colonial context, margins of appreciation 
and other forms of accommodation were often invoked as governing legal 
principles. For example, English courts were empowered to exercise the 
jurisdiction of the English courts of law and chancery only “as far as 
circumstances [would] admit.”222 Likewise, with respect to personal laws, 
the Straits Settlements Charter of 1855 allowed the courts of judicature to 
exercise jurisdiction as an ecclesiastical court “so far as the religions, 
manners and customs of the inhabitants admit.”223 By the end of the 
 
 215. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND 
ROME 193 (Arno Press 1979) (1911). 
 216. See DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 220, 222–24 (1978). 
 217. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER 7 (1994). 
 218. Id. at 8. 
 219. Id. at 10. 
 220. Id. at 13. 
 221. See supra text accompanying notes 55–60. 
 222. Siak v. Drashid, [1946] 1 MALAYAN L.J. 147, 152 (App. Ct. Sept. 13, 1941) (citations 
omitted). 
 223. ROLAND ST. JOHN BRADDELL, THE LAW OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS 17 (3d ed. 1982). 
Interestingly, in the era prior to the Age of Empire, English courts would only defer to indigenous laws 
of Christian communities. For example, in Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, [18a] (1608), reprinted in 77 
Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (1932), Lord Coke stated: 
[I]f a King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest . . . he may at his pleasure alter and 
change the laws of that kingdom: but until he [does] make an alteration of those laws the 
ancient laws . . . remain. But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and 
bring them under his subjection, [then] ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that 
they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature, contained in 
the decalogue . . . . 
However, by at least 1774, that distinction appears to have fallen into disrepute. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
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colonial era, indigenous law was recognized as law proper by all of the 
colonial powers.224 
Today, particularly in countries with a large minority Muslim 
population, many states maintain space for personal law within a nominally 
Westphalian legal structure. These nation-states—ranging from Canada to 
Egypt to India to Singapore—recognize parallel civil and religious legal 
systems, often with their own separate courts.225 And civil legal authorities 
are frequently called on to determine the margin of appreciation to be given 
to such personal law. For example, the Indian Supreme Court has famously 
attempted to bridge secular and Islamic law in two decisions involving 
Muslim women’s right to maintenance after divorce.226 At the same time, 
issues arise concerning the extent to which members of a particular 
religious or ethnic community can opt out of their personal law and adopt 
the law of the nation-state. For example, in 1988 a Sri Lankan court 
decided that a Muslim couple could adopt a child according to state 
regulation, but could not confer inheritance rights on their adopted child 
because Islamic Law did not recognize adoption.227 Even outside of the 
context of Islamic law, the United States Supreme Court has at times 
deferred to the independent parallel courts maintained by Indian 
populations located within U.S. territorial borders.228 And beyond judicial 
bodies, we increasingly see other governmental entities, such as banking 
regulators, forced to oversee forms of financing that conform to religious 
principles.229 Of course, sometimes deference to religious or ethnic 
affiliations can be insufficiently protective of other values, such as the 
rights of women.230 Nevertheless, these sorts of negotiations, like all the 
 
Hall, Lofft. 655, 716 (1774), reprinted in 98 Eng. Rep. 848, 882 (1932): (“Don’t quote the distinction 
[between Christians and non-Christians], for the honour of my Lord Coke.”). 
 224. DAVID PEARL, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH 
26 (1981). Pearl excludes Germany, but notes that even Germany established an internal conflicts of 
law regime, which seems implicitly to recognize some sort of autonomous legitimacy for indigenous 
practices. Id. 
 225. See Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari’a and the Convention 
Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1984 (1995); DeNeen L. Brown, Canadians Allow Islamic 
Courts to Decide Disputes, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at A14 (discussing an Islamic Court of Civil 
Justice in Ontario, staffed by arbitrators trained in both Shari’a and Canadian civil law). 
 226. See Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945; Danial Latifi v. 
Union of India, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3958. 
 227. See, e.g., Ghouse v. Ghouse, 1988 1 Sri LR 25. 
 228. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 229. See, e.g., Tavia Grant, A Hot New Banking Trend: Sharia-Compliant Finance, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), May 7, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 8607324 (Westlaw NewsRoom). 
 230. See, e.g., Resnik, Legal Commitments, supra note 170, at 48–49 (criticizing Santa Clara 
Pueblo on this ground); Mary Anne Case, On Feminist Fundamentalism (2007) (unpublished 
BERM13 10/1/2007 10:11:21 AM 
2007] GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 1207 
limited autonomy regimes surveyed in this section, reflect official 
recognition of essential hybridity that the state cannot wish away. 
D.  SUBSIDIARITY SCHEMES 
Subsidiarity is another mechanism for managing the interactions 
between different legal or quasi-legal authorities. The Catholic Church first 
developed subsidiarity as an ordering principle designed to keep so-called 
“higher” levels of authority from trenching unduly on the “internal life of a 
community.”231 Thus, it was deemed “an injustice and at the same time a 
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.”232 This 
principle seeks to push authority for decision making “down” to the most 
local or smallest unit of governance that is feasible.233 
Subsidiarity has also, of course, become an integral concept for 
managing relations between national and supranational governing bodies in 
Europe.234 For example, Article 5 of the European Community Treaty 
 
manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that feminist commitments should be deemed as fundamental, 
and as deserving of deference, as religious ones). 
 231. See VATICAN, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1883 (1992) (“A community of a 
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter 
of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the 
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good”) (quoting POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 48 (1991)), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a 
8.htm. (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). 
 232. POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2007). 
 233. For discussions of the Catholic Church understanding of subsidiarity, see generally Thomas 
C. Kohler, Quadragesimo Anno, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON “RERUM 
NOVARUM” AND NINE OTHER KEY DOCUMENTS 27, 31 (George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991);  
Joseph P. Rompala, “Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends”: Recurring Themes in Welfare 
Reform in the United States and Great Britain and What the Principle of Subsidiarity Can Do to Break 
the Pattern, 29 J. LEGIS. 307, 331 (2003); Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: 
Understanding and Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 549, 550 (1997) (quoting 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH). 
 234. The literature on subsidiarity within the European context is voluminous. Indeed, as early as 
1993 Joseph Weiler was already calling academic subsidiarity commentary a “growth industry,” J.H.H. 
Weiler, Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of 
Justice in the Arena of Political Integration, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 417, 437 (1993), and there is 
no indication that interest in subsidiarity has weakened since. Among many useful treatments, see for 
example, N.W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 EUROPEAN L.J. 308 (2005); George A. 
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Deborah Z. Cass, The Word that Saves Maastricht? The 
Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European Community, 29 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1107 (1992); Kees van Kersbergen & Bertjan Verbeek, Subsidiarity as a Principle of 
Governance in the European Union, 2 COMP. EUR. POL. 142, 151 (2004); Mattias Kumm, The 
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provides that any action falling within the concurrent competence of the 
European Community and the Member States should only be taken by the 
Community “if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.”235 Interestingly, sovereignty—a concept steeped in absolutist 
rhetoric—has, by some accounts, been replaced by subsidiarity—which is a 
more flexible mechanism for managing hybridity—as “the core idea that 
serves to demarcate the respective spheres of the national and 
international.”236 
Unlike sovereignty, a subsidiarity regime does not pose an outright bar 
to governance at the “higher” level of authority. But it does not offer a 
blank check either. The idea is to foster careful and repeated consideration 
of other potential lawmaking communities. Thus, “at its core the principle 
of subsidiarity requires any infringements of the autonomy of the local 
level by means of pre-emptive norms enacted on the higher level to be 
justified by good reasons.”237 Accordingly, it is not enough for, say, a 
supranational governance rule simply to be a good idea; the supranational 
lawmaking community also must consider whether the rule is one that is 
appropriately enacted at the supranational level, given contrary local 
policies. 
For example, consider the case of a higher-level authority that enacts 
an emissions cap in order to combat global climate change, but runs up 
against a lower-level authority that performed its own cost-benefit analysis 
and determined that it was better for the local economy not to create such a 
stringent restriction.238 Here the collective action problems inherent in the 
lower-level authority’s parochial cost-benefit analysis would probably 
 
Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 
920–24 (2004); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 668–69 (1999); 
Phil Syrpis, In Defence of Subsidiarity, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (2004) (reviewing ANTONIO 
ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE (2002)); A.G. Toth, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992). 
 235. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 41 
(“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.”). 
 236. Kumm, supra note 234, at 920–21. See also, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Democracy, 
Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European Commonwealth,’ 16 L. & PHIL. 331, 338 (1997) (arguing 
that Europe is now “post-sovereign,” having evolved beyond sovereignty). 
 237. Kumm, supra note 234, at 921. 
 238. This hypothetical example derives from one offered by Kumm, id. at 923–24. 
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justify intervention at the higher level. In contrast, a higher-level rule 
limiting nicotine consumption might not override a more permissive local 
rule because the locality can plausibly decide it wants to bear the higher 
healthcare costs or other consequences that might result. 
As with all mechanisms for managing hybridity, the line-drawing 
problems are potentially difficult and often politically contested, but even 
just the habits of mind generated by thinking in terms of subsidiarity can 
help ensure that lawmaking communities at least take into account other 
potentially relevant lawmaking communities.239 Moreover, subsidiarity can 
help “local populations . . . better preserve their sense of social and cultural 
identity,”240 while still allowing for the possibility that higher level 
governmental authority might sometimes be necessary. Finally, even 
though a subsidiarity regime sets the default in favor of the local and 
therefore requires articulated justifications to override the presumption, 
subsidiarity-related concerns can sometimes actually strengthen the 
perceived legitimacy of the higher-level authority as well. This is because, 
when the higher authority does override local regulation, it presumably 
does so only after careful consideration of local practices and only after 
articulating reasons to justify such an override.241 Accordingly, the 
institutional processes of subsidiarity aim to ensure dialogue among 
multiple legal communities, leading ideally to increased acceptance of 
each. Not surprisingly, subsidiarity has been proposed as a more general 
model for international law as well.242 
 
 239. I realize that my discussion of subsidiarity has a functionalist cast and therefore may seem to 
deemphasize other concerns, such as democratic legitimacy or the nation-state’s claims to loyalty as 
against supranational institutions. See, e.g., Lindseth, supra note 234, at 669 (arguing that a 
functionalist approach “is clearly inadequate to understanding the full import of the subsidiarity 
principle” because it tends to ignore important issues of legitimacy); Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity 
and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 618 (1994) (“[T]he underlying 
logic of subsidiarity reduces the claim of rightful governance to a technocratic question of functional 
efficiency that will eventually undercut the nation-state’s claims to loyalty.”). The sort of dialogue that 
mechanisms for managing hybridity encourage, however, need not be “technocratic” and can in fact 
engage with precisely the questions of legitimacy and community ties that critics want. Thus, I argue 
only for mechanisms that enhance dialogue; I do not circumscribe the content of that dialogue. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that critics of a functionalist account of subsidiarity are trying to raise a 
sovereigntist objection to supranationalism in general, the pluralist framework I pursue in this Article 
clearly rejects such a position as both normatively undesirable and impractical. See supra Part III.A. 
 240. Bermann, supra note 234, at 341. 
 241. See Kumm, supra note 234, at 922 (“If there are good reasons for deciding an issue on the 
international level, because the concerns addressed are concerns best addressed by a larger community, 
then the international level enjoys greater jurisdictional legitimacy.”). 
 242. See, e.g., id. at 921. 
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E.  JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCIES 
Many of the legal conundrums of a hybrid world arise because of 
jurisdictional redundancy. That is, as noted throughout this Article, 
multiple legal communities frequently seek to assert jurisdiction over the 
same act or actor. Yet, while this jurisdictional overlap is frequently viewed 
as a problem because it potentially creates conflicting obligations and 
uncertainty, we might also view jurisdictional redundancy as a necessary 
adaptive feature of a multivariate, pluralist legal system. Indeed, as the 
examples throughout this Part indicate, jurisdictional redundancy may itself 
be thought of as a mechanism for managing hybridity because the existence 
of overlapping jurisdictional claims often leads to a nuanced negotiation—
either explicit or implicit—between or among the various communities 
making those claims. 
In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional 
redundancy, I echo the insights of Robert Cover in his article The Uses of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation.243 Although 
his essay was focused particularly on the variety of “official” law 
pronouncers in the U.S. federal system, Cover identified some of the 
benefits that accrue from having multiple overlapping jurisdictional 
assertions, regardless of the context. Such benefits include a greater 
possibility for error correction, a more robust field for norm articulation, 
and a larger space for creative innovation.244 And though Cover 
acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to seek out a messy and 
indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single 
authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a 
system “that permits the tensions and conflicts of the social order” to be 
played out in the jurisdictional structure of the system.245 Thus, Cover’s 
pluralism, though here focused on U.S. federalism, can be said to include 
the creative possibilities inherent in multiple overlapping jurisdictions 
asserted by both state and non-state entities in whatever context they arise. 
More recently, Judith Resnik has noted the “multiple ports of entry” that a 
federalist society creates246 and has argued that what constitutes the 
appropriate spheres for “local,” “national,” and “international” regulation 
 
 243. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
 244. See id. 
 245. Id. at 682. 
 246. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).  
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and adjudication changes over time and cannot be essentialized.247 Not 
surprisingly, other commentators have at times advocated what amounts to 
a federalist approach to national/supranational relations.248 
With regard to state-to-state jurisdictional redundancy, consider 
Spanish efforts to assert jurisdiction over members of the Argentine 
military. In August 2003, Judge Baltasar Garzón sought extradition from 
Argentina of dozens of Argentines for human rights abuses committed 
under the Argentine military government in the 1970s.249 In addition, 
Garzón successfully sought extradition from Mexico of one former 
Argentine Navy lieutenant who was accused of murdering hundreds of 
people.250 In the wake of Garzón’s actions, realist observers complained 
that such transnational prosecutions were illegitimate because Argentina 
had previously conferred amnesty on those who had been involved in the 
period of military rule and therefore any prosecution would infringe on 
Argentina’s sovereign “choice” to grant amnesty.251 
But the amnesty decision was not simply a unitary choice made by 
some unified “state” of Argentina; it was a politically contested act that 
remained controversial within the country.252 And the Spanish extradition 
request itself gave President Néstor Kirchner more leverage in his tug-of-
war with the legal establishment over the amnesty laws. Just a month after 
Garzón’s request, both houses of the Argentine Congress voted by large 
majorities to annul the laws.253 Meanwhile the Spanish government decided 
 
 247. See Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 473–74 
(1996) (“My point is not only that particular subject matter may go back and forth between state and 
federal governance but also that the tradition of allocation itself is one constantly being reworked; 
periodically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal authority, and the lines move.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Kumm, supra note 234, at 922 (arguing that subsidiarity should be a general 
principle to be applied both with regard to federally structured entities and “with regard to the 
management of the national/international divide”). 
 249. See Larry Rohter, Argentine Congress Likely to Void ‘Dirty War’ Amnesties, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 2003, at A3 (recounting Garzón’s extradition request). 
 250. Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Sends Argentine to Prison on Genocide Charge, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2003, at A3 (“In an unusual act of international judicial cooperation, and a victory for the 
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled this month that the former officer, 
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, could be extradited to Spain for crimes reportedly committed in a third 
country, Argentina.”). 
 251. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Crimes Outside the World’s Jurisdiction, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A19 (noting that Argentina had granted amnesty to Cavallo and arguing that 
“Judge Garzón is essentially ignoring Argentina’s own history and desires”). 
 252. The Argentine army, for example, made known its desire for amnesty for human rights 
abuses through several revolts in the late 1980s. The Argentine Congress granted amnesty after one 
such uprising in 1987. See Joseph B. Treaster, Argentine President Orders Troops to End Revolt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, § 1, at 3 (describing an army revolt in Buenos Aires). 
 253. Argentina’s Day of Reckoning, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2004, at C26. 
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that it would not make the formal extradition request to Argentina that 
Garzón sought, but it did so based primarily on the fact that Argentina had 
begun to scrap its amnesty laws and the accused would therefore be subject 
to domestic human rights prosecution.254 President Kirchner therefore 
could use Spain’s announcement to increase pressure on the Argentine 
Supreme Court to officially overturn the amnesty laws.255 Finally, on June 
14, 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court did in fact strike down the amnesty 
laws, thus clearing the way for domestic human rights prosecutions.256 In 
the wake of that decision, 772 people, nearly all from the military or secret 
police, face criminal charges and investigations in Argentina.257 So, in the 
end, the “sovereign” state of Argentina made political and legal choices to 
repeal the amnesty laws just as it had previously made choices to create 
them. But in this change of heart we can see the degree to which 
jurisdictional redundancy may significantly alter the domestic political 
terrain. 
Likewise, Judge Garzón’s earlier efforts to assert jurisdiction over 
former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet,258 though not literally 
 
 254. Elizabeth Nash, Garzón Blocked Over “Dirty War” Extraditions, INDEP. (London), Aug. 30, 
2003, at 14. See also Al Goodman, Spain Blocks Trials of Argentines, CNN.COM, Aug. 29, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/08/29/spanish.argentina/index.html (quoting the Spanish 
attorney for the victims saying that the Spanish government’s decision sends a “powerful message” to 
Argentina’s Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws). 
 255. See Héctor Tobar, Judge Orders Officers Freed: The Argentine Military Men Accused of 
Rights Abuses in the ‘70s and ‘80s May Still Face Trials, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at A3 (“President 
Néstor Kirchner used Spain’s announcement to increase pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to 
overturn the amnesty laws that prohibit trying the men here.”). 
 256. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación 
ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.). See also Press Release, Human 
Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down (June 14, 2005), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14/argent11119.htm. Interestingly, the Argentine Court cited as 
legal precedent a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights striking down a similar 
amnesty provision in Peru as incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and hence 
without legal effect. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ 
privación ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.). See also Press Release, 
supra. Thus, the Inter-American Court pronouncement played an important norm-generating role, even 
though it was not backed by coercive force. 
 257. Slaking a Thirst for Justice, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2007, at 39, 40. 
 258. Judge Garzón issued an arrest order based on allegations of kidnappings, torture, and planned 
disappearances of Chilean citizens and citizens of other countries. Spanish Request to Arrest General 
Pinochet, Oct. 16, 1998, reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN 
SPAIN AND BRITAIN 57–59 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE PINOCHET 
PAPERS]. See also Anne Swardson, Pinochet Case Tries Spanish Legal Establishment, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 22, 1998, at A27 (“As Chilean president from 1973 to 1990, Garzón’s arrest order said, Pinochet 
was ‘the leader of an international organization created . . . to conceive, develop and execute the 
systematic planning of illegal detentions [kidnappings], torture, forced relocations, assassinations and/or 
disappearances of numerous persons, including Argentines, Spaniards, Britons, Americans, Chileans 
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“successful” because Pinochet was never extradited to Spain,259 
strengthened the hands of human rights advocates within Chile itself and 
provided the impetus for a movement that led to a Chilean Supreme Court 
decision stripping Pinochet of his lifetime immunity.260 In 2006 the Chilean 
court further ruled that Chile was subject to the Geneva Conventions during 
the period of Pinochet’s rule and that neither statutes of limitations nor 
amnesties could be invoked to block prosecutions for serious violations of 
the Conventions, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.261 To 
date, 148 people, including nearly 50 military officers, have been convicted 
for human rights violations committed during this era, and over 400 more 
suspects, mostly from the armed forces, have been indicted or are under 
investigation.262 One might even see Italy’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
U.S. CIA agents who allegedly abducted a terrorist suspect as a source of 
alternative norms concerning the appropriate role for civil liberties in the 
conduct of antiterrorism operations.263 Such norms may have broader 
influence over time. 
Turning to international assertions of jurisdiction, we can see again 
that even the potential jurisdictional assertion of an alternative norm-
generating community can put pressure on local politics. For example, 
 
and other nationalities.’”). On October 30, 1998, the Spanish National Court ruled unanimously that 
Spanish courts had jurisdiction over the matter based both on the principle of universal jurisdiction (that 
crimes against humanity can be tried anywhere at any time) and the passive personality principle of 
jurisdiction (that courts may try cases if their nationals are victims of crime, regardless of where the 
crime was committed). Order of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional affirming 
Spain’s Jurisdiction, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra, at 95–107. 
The Office of the Special Prosecutor alleged that Spaniards living in Chile were among those killed 
under Pinochet’s rule. Id. at 106. 
 259. Pinochet was physically in Great Britain. The British House of Lords ultimately ruled that 
Pinochet was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for acts of torture and could be extradited to Spain. 
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 
204–05 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B. Div’l Ct.) (holding that the International Convention 
Against Torture, incorporated into United Kingdom law in 1988, prevented Pinochet from claiming 
head-of-state immunity after 1988, because the universal jurisdiction contemplated by the Convention is 
inconsistent with immunity for former heads of state). Nevertheless, the British government refused to 
extradite, citing Pinochet’s failing health. See Statement of Sec’y of State Jack Straw in the House of 
Commons, Mar. 2, 2000, in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 258, at 481, 482 (“[I]n the light of th[e] 
medical evidence . . . I . . . conclude[d] that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish 
extradition request.”). Pinochet was eventually returned to Chile. Anthony Faiola, Pinochet Returns to 
Chile: Flight from Britain Ends 16-Month Extradition Crusade, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at A1. 
 260. See Chile’s Top Court Strips Pinochet of Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A3 
(“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet of immunity from prosecution 
in a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising hopes of victims that he may finally face trial for 
abuses during his 17-year rule.”). 
 261. Slaking a Thirst for Justice, supra note 257, at 39. 
 262. Id. at 39–40. 
 263. See Wilkinson & De Cristofaro, supra note 151. 
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although international courts do not generally have the power to force 
states to surrender suspects, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) instituted Rule 11 bis proceedings, whereby 
public hearings were held at the indictment phase.264 Such hearings 
publicized the various cases and the atrocities alleged, thereby helping 
pressure states to turn over suspects. And, of course, the prosecution of 
Slobodan Milošević may well have played at least some role in weakening 
his hold on power in Serbia, ultimately bringing about his ouster from 
government. 
Even without formal court proceedings, the United Nations can 
influence local political realities by asserting forms of jurisdiction. For 
example, when the UN creates international commissions of inquiry 
concerning alleged atrocities or threatens prosecutions in international 
courts, such acts can empower reformers within local bureaucracies, who 
can then argue for institutional changes as a way of staving off 
international interference. Thus, in the aftermath of the violence in East 
Timor that followed its vote for independence, there were grave concerns 
that the Indonesian government would not pursue human rights 
investigations of the military personnel allegedly responsible for the 
violence.265 Accordingly, an International Commission of Inquiry was 
established, and UN officials warned that an international court might be 
necessary.266 As with Argentina, such actions strengthened the hand of 
reformers within Indonesia, such as then-Attorney General Marzuki 
Darusman. With the specter of international action hanging over Indonesia, 
Darusman made several statements arguing that, for nationalist reasons, a 
hard-hitting Indonesian investigation was necessary in order to forestall an 
international takeover of the process.267 Not surprisingly, when this 
international pressure dissipated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, so did the momentum to provide real accountability in Indonesia for 
 
 264. See Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. 
Doc. IT/32/Rev. 38 (June 13, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/ 
IT032Rev38e.pdf. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Rule 11 bis 
concerns, inter alia, the procedure by which the Trial Chamber issues arrest warrants. Id. 
 265. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among 
Domestic, International, and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia, 
in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 319, 358–61 (Jane 
E. Stromseth ed., 2003) (discussing ways in which international pressure on Indonesia in the period just 
after East Timor gained its independence strengthened the hand of reformers within the Indonesian 
government to push for robust domestic accountability mechanisms for atrocities committed during the 
period leading up to the independence vote). 
 266. Id. at 358–59. 
 267. See id. at 360 (documenting the response of the Indonesian government, which appointed an 
investigative team, identified priority cases, named suspects, and collected evidence). 
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the atrocities committed.268 
Complementarity regimes are a more formalized way of harnessing 
the potential power of jurisdictional redundancy. Here the idea is that when 
two legal communities claim jurisdiction over an actor, one community 
agrees not to assert jurisdiction, but only so long as the other community 
takes action. This is a hybrid mechanism because one community does not 
hierarchically impose a solution on the other, but it does assert influence on 
the other’s domestic process through its mere presence as a potential 
jurisdictional actor in the future. 
The best-known complementarity regime in the world today is the one 
enshrined in the statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
Pursuant to Article 17, the ICC cannot prosecute someone unless the 
suspect’s home country is unwilling or unable to investigate.269 As with 
most mechanisms for managing hybridity, this one has been criticized by 
both sides in the nation-state sovereignty/international human rights debate. 
Thus, sovereigntist voices in the United States condemn the ICC as an 
encroachment on state prerogatives,270 despite the fact that ICC jurisdiction 
over U.S. citizens is easily staved off so long as our domestic or military 
authorities simply conduct the type of investigations that a democratic 
citizenry would normally expect in response to allegations of serious 
human rights abuses. On the other hand, international human rights 
advocates fear the complementarity regime will permit too many potential 
suspects to skirt international justice.271 This concern, however, discounts 
the catalytic impact that even the possibility of international prosecutions 
can have. 
The important catalytic function of complementarity has not been lost 
on the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. In one of his first speeches 
upon assuming office, Moreno-Ocampo noted that “As a consequence of 
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the [ICC] should not be a 
 
 268. See id. at 364–66 (discussing the shifting priorities of the Bush administration following the 
9/11 attacks and tracing the impact of outside pressure in efforts to hold individuals accountable for the 
violence in East Timor). 
 269. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 270. See, e.g., Miles A. Pomper, Helms Gives Blunt Message to U.N. Security Council: Don’t 
Tread on U.S., 58 CQ WEEKLY 4, Jan. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 201231 (Westlaw 
NewsRoom) (reporting that Sen. Jesse Helms “criticized the proposed International Criminal Court as 
an intrusion on sovereignty and stated that the U.S. should be free to pursue unilateral military action 
overseas”). 
 271. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 583, 613 (Antonio Cassese, 
Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (referring to the rejection of universal jurisdiction as a 
“painful weakness” of the ICC regime). 
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measure [of] its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before 
[the ICC], as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions, would be a major success.”272 Moreno-Ocampo therefore 
announced that he would take a “positive approach to complementarity,” 
and encourage (and perhaps even aid) national governments to undertake 
their own investigations and prosecutions.273 
According to William Burke-White, this idea of proactive 
complementarity, if it is truly pursued, would create a hybrid system of 
judicial enforcement for the prosecution of the most serious international 
crimes, under which the ICC and national governments share the ability 
and the duty to act and would therefore necessarily be engaged in a broad 
series of interactions directed toward accountability. Indeed, the ICC could 
become a contributor to the effective functioning of national judiciaries and 
investigative bodies. The result of such a policy, Burke-White argues, “may 
be a virtuous circle, in which the [ICC] welcomes national judicial efforts 
and stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the threat of 
international intervention.”274 
Of course, we should not assume that international jurisdictional 
assertions always work as a force for increased human rights protections. 
Indeed, as Kim Lane Scheppele has documented, recent Security Council 
resolutions, backed by threat of sanctions, require countries to enact 
antiterrorism legislation and adjust antiterrorism policies regardless of 
domestic, constitutionally-based, civil liberties concerns.275 Nevertheless, 
the important point is to see jurisdictional overlap in the state and 
supranational spheres as a hybrid legal space where alternative norms are 
proposed and contested. 
 
 272. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Ceremony for 
the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo_english_final.pdf. 
 273. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Statement to 
Diplomatic Corps (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_2004 
0212_En.pdf. 
 274. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court 
and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice 5 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-08, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=964201. 
See also Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and 
National Prosecutions, A View From Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (2000) (discussing ways 
in which the International Criminal Court’s complementarity regime, supplemented with other forms of 
aid, can support local prosecutions).  
 275. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The International State of Emergency: Challenges to 
Constitutionalism After September 11 3–4 (Sept. 21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/schmooze_papers/49/. 
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Sometimes, instead of one jurisdiction ultimately adopting the other’s 
norms in toto, we may see the existence of jurisdictional redundancy open 
up space for the creation of hybrid substantive norms. For example, 
Graeme Dinwoodie has argued that national courts should decide 
international copyright cases not by choosing an applicable law, but by 
devising an applicable solution, reflecting the values of all interested 
systems, national and international, that may have a prescriptive claim on 
the outcome.276 Similarly, where once courts simply adjudicated 
bankruptcies independently, based on the presence of assets in their 
territorial jurisdiction, global insolvencies are now often dealt with by 
courts working cooperatively.277 
Finally, it is important to note that jurisdictional redundancy can also 
work from “bottom-up,” with non-state norms being appropriated into state 
(or international) law. The most obvious example of state law’s recognition 
of non-state lawmaking is in the common law’s ongoing incorporation of 
social custom and practice. As scholars have recognized, “[d]ecisionmakers 
work under a continuing pressure to incorporate customary rules into their 
decisions.”278 Sometimes such incorporation is explicit, as when a 
regulatory regime references non-state accreditation standards,279 or a 
statute is interpreted (or even supplanted) by reference to industry 
custom280 or when a law of sales that would accord with merchant reality 
was adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code,281 or when the rules 
promulgated by a small community of trade finance bankers were 
ultimately appropriated by the World Trade Organization into their official 
legal instruments.282 Even when the impact of non-state norms is 
 
 276. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15. 
 277. See Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, 
Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1037 (1997). See also 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 191, 214 (2003). See 
generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law 
and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991).  
 278. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 69, at 330. 
 279. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 280. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 71, at 57–59 (arguing that the act of interpretation permits 
courts to adjust official legal norms to match custom or usage); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836–1915 289–
94 (1964) (describing the ways in which local norms in the Wisconsin lumber industry played a 
significant role in the way contract law was applied). 
 281. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 503–19 (1987) (describing Karl Llewellyn’s initial drafts of what later 
became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 282. Levit, supra note 27, at 165 (describing the incorporation of an informal “Gentleman’s 
Agreement” on export credits as a safe harbor in the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing measures). 
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unacknowledged, state-sponsored law may only be deemed legitimate to 
the extent that its official pronouncements reflect the “common 
understandings of private laws and customs.”283 Indeed, the invention of 
legal fictions often indicates that official norms are being adjusted to more 
closely reflect the dictates of non-state norms and practices. 
Of course, all of these jurisdictional redundancies might be seen as 
perhaps necessary but regrettable concessions to the realities of a world of 
normative disagreement. Such a view would focus on concerns about 
forum shopping, uncertainty about applicable rules, litigation costs, and so 
forth. In order to minimize such difficulties, we might seek international 
harmonization or more strict territorialist rules to cut off some of the 
overlap. But, as discussed previously, such efforts are unlikely ever to be 
fully effective. Thus, jurisdictional overlap is likely to continue to be a 
reality. Moreover, a pluralist framework allows us to see ways in which 
jurisdictional redundancy might sometimes be a generative feature of a 
hybrid legal world, and not simply a problem to be eliminated. 
F.  HYBRID PARTICIPATION ARRANGEMENTS 
Sometimes hybridity can be addressed not so much through the 
relationships among multiple communities and their decision makers as by 
hybridizing the decision making body or process itself. For example, from 
1190 until 1870, English law used the so-called “mixed jury,” or “jury de 
medietate linguae,” with members of two different communities sitting side 
by side to settle disputes when people from the two communities came into 
conflict.284 Sir Edward Coke attributed this practice “to the Saxons, for 
whom ‘twelve men versed in the law, six English and an equal number of 
Welsh, dispense justice to the English and Welsh.’”285 Regional 
differences, however, were not the only type of community variation 
recognized in the mixed-jury custom. Mixed juries were also used in 
disputes between Jews and Christians,286 city and country dwellers,287 and 
 
 283. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 69, at 329. 
 284. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial By Jury De Medietate 
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994). See also CONSTABLE, 
supra note 217, at 8 (explaining the practice of mixed juries in early England). 
 285. CONSTABLE, supra note 217, at 17 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 234 (1628)). 
 286. See id. at 18–21 (noting that half-Jewish, half-Christian juries heard suits between Jews and 
non-Jews in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries); Ramirez, supra note 284, at 783–84 
(arguing that mixed juries originated in part from the king’s desire to protect Jewish capital, which was 
subject to high assessments and escheatment to the crown, rather than lose it to Christians in an unfair 
trial). 
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merchants and nonmerchants.288 In the United States, the custom of mixed 
juries was imported from England and used in disputes between settlers and 
indigenous people289 and in other interjurisdictional disputes at least 
through the beginning of the twentieth century.290 Karl Llewellyn’s 
proposal that merchant experts sit as a tribunal to hear commercial disputes 
relies on a similar idea that specialized communities may possess relevant 
knowledge or background that should be called upon in rendering just 
verdicts.291 
The principles underlying mixed juries can still be found today. 
Indeed, the line of United States Supreme Court decisions involving 
peremptory challenges of jurors could be seen as responding in part to a felt 
imperative that jury panels reflect both racial and gender diversity.292 Nor 
is this a misplaced imperative, given studies indicating that racially mixed 
juries tend to deliberate longer, consider more facts, raise more questions, 
and discuss more racial issues than all-white juries.293 In addition, racially 
mixed juries have been found to make fewer factual errors than single-race 
juries, and when factual inaccuracies do arise, they are more likely to be 
corrected in racially mixed juries than in single-race juries.294 
In the human rights arena, hybrid domestic/international courts 
 
 287. See CONSTABLE, supra note 217, at 17 (recounting an action involving a country-dweller in 
twelfth century London that required that at least one of the jurors be of “the county in which the 
foreigner dwells” (citation omitted)). 
 288. See id. at 23–25 (exploring the evolution of “mixed merchant juries” in early England); 
Ramirez, supra note 284, at 784–86 (recognizing the King’s regard for foreign merchants, which 
prompted the use of mixed juries in order to promote a “perception of fairness” to outsiders and attract 
their capital and goods). 
 289. See Katherine A. Hermes, Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast: Algonquian, English and 
French Governance, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 64–65 (1999) (discussing the implementation of a 
mixed-jury system in colonial Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts). 
 290. See Ramirez, supra note 284, at 790 (noting that “[a]t various times between 1674 and 1911, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and South Carolina each 
provided for mixed juries”). 
 291. See Wiseman, supra note 281, at 512–15 (describing Llewellyn’s merchant-tribunal 
proposal). 
 292. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (forbidding prosecutors from challenging 
jurors solely on the basis of race). See also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (extending 
Batson to peremptory challenges based on gender). 
 293. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1028 
(2003). 
 294. See id. See also Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in 
Jury Selection, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 17, 20 (1999) (“Jury research shows that racially heterogeneous juries 
are more likely than single race juries to enhance the quality of deliberations. A number of empirical 
studies . . . show that racially mixed juries minimize the distorting risk of bias.” (citation omitted)). 
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continue the tradition of the mixed jury.295 Such hybrid courts have been 
employed in transitional justice settings in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra 
Leone, and now Cambodia. In these courts, domestic judges—ideally 
drawn from the multiple political, racial, or ethnic groups involved in the 
larger geopolitical conflict—sit alongside international judges, and 
domestic and international lawyers also work together to prosecute the 
cases.296 
Scholars suggest that, at least in theory, hybrid courts hold the promise 
of addressing some of the problems encountered in post-conflict settings by 
wholly international courts on the one hand, and wholly domestic courts on 
the other.297 Such problems can be grouped into three categories: 
legitimacy, capacity building, and norm penetration.298 With regard to 
legitimacy concerns, the rationale for hybrid courts is largely the same as 
for mixed juries. If there is broad representation from the various 
communities involved in the dispute, then the outcome of the trial is more 
likely to be palatable to a cross-section of the population. Moreover, the 
presence of judges from the broader international community may 
contribute to a sense of fairness both for others watching the process from 
afar and for domestic populations who fear that local judges will rule based 
on sectarian prejudices. On the other hand, the presence of local judges 
may protect against rejection of the court as wholly “foreign,” a perception 
that has, for example, bedeviled the ICTY. The hybrid court may therefore 
be seen as the best available compromise. Turning to capacity building, a 
hybrid court physically located in the region may be preferable to an 
international court elsewhere because resources both for physical 
infrastructure and for training will be more likely to flow into the 
country.299 Finally, scholars argue, hybrid courts may help train a cadre of 
domestic lawyers in international legal standards and give them the tools 
necessary to develop and adapt those international norms in local settings. 
Meanwhile, the international actors are more likely to understand better the 
local nuances that may complicate the application of universal norms.300 
It should be noted that, at least so far, the hybrid courts have failed to 
 
 295. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 
(2003). 
 296. See id. 
 297. See, e.g., id. at 300. 
 298. See id. at 301–05. 
 299. Of course, sometimes trials in the post-conflict locale may be too dangerous, thus 
necessitating a more distant situs for the court. 
 300. See Dickinson, supra note 295, at 301–05. 
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fully live up to their promise.301 Nevertheless, they may still be preferable 
to wholly international or wholly domestic courts for many of the reasons 
set forth above. Moreover, most of the problems the courts have 
encountered are traceable to failures of implementation—for example, 
inadequate funding; they do not necessarily call into question the 
usefulness of the institutional model as a whole. In any event, a hybrid 
court will often be the only viable political compromise, reflecting—as in 
almost all the examples surveyed in this Article—the impracticality of 
wholly universalist or wholly territorialist responses and the resulting need 
for some sort of hybrid mechanism. Moreover, as Stephen Krasner has 
theorized, the sort of “shared sovereignty”302 reflected in the hybrid court 
structure can be particularly important when domestic institutions are weak 
because it can “gird new political structures with more expertise, better-
crafted policies, and guarantees against abuses of power.”303 Following this 
logic, the Dayton Accords effectively made the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court a hybrid court, authorizing the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights to appoint three non-Bosnian judges to the nine-member 
court.304 A different kind of hybrid is the Israeli Supreme Court, which has, 
since its inception, customarily had at least one member who is an expert in 
Jewish law.305 
We can also see hybrid arrangements outside of the judicial context. 
For example, in the oil pipeline agreement between Chad and the World 
Bank, the two parties share control and governance of the project.306 As a 
condition for its participation, the World Bank insisted on a revenue 
management plan aimed at ensuring that the proceeds of oil exploration 
would be used for socioeconomic development within the country.307 To 
that end, the plan contains important limitations on how the expected oil 
 
 301. See, e.g., Justice Should Be Done, but Where? The Relationship Between National and 
International Courts, 101 ASIL PROC. (forthcoming 2007) (remarks of Laura A. Dickinson, on file with 
author) (discussing shortcomings). 
 302. Such “shared sovereignty” arrangements, according to Krasner, “involve[] the creation of 
institutions for governing specific issue areas within a state—areas over which external and internal 
actors voluntarily share authority.” Stephen D. Krasner, The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. 
DEMOCRACY 69, 76 (2005). 
 303. Id. at 70. 
 304. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 
annex 4, art. VI, ¶ 1(a), Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 117, 123. 
 305. See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, Growing a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty and Community in 
Israel and the United States, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 257 (1994). 
 306. For a useful description of the terms of the project, see Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, 
Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 38–46 
(2005). 
 307. Id. at 40. 
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revenue can be invested and spent.308 In addition, oversight of the revenue 
plan is shared. Both the World Bank and the government of Chad must 
approve the annual expenditure of generated revenues, and there is a nine-
member oversight committee, seven of whom represent the government 
while two represent civil society.309 The committee annually publishes a 
review of operations, and those operations are subject to external audit.310 
Finally, the World Bank’s International Advisory Group and Inspection 
Panel retains oversight power.311 Whether such measures will result in 
effective hybrid governance remains to be seen. But significantly, most of 
the criticisms of the plan thus far tend to focus on the particular terms of 
the shared sovereignty arrangement, not the hybrid structure itself. 312 
It is not only officially constituted courts, governments, and 
international institutions that may benefit from hybrid participation 
arrangements in the international sphere. Consider, for example, the 
dilemmas raised by questions of Internet standard-setting and governance. 
Of course, global governance of the Internet is a problematic and contested 
area because of the wide variety of potentially relevant community norms 
(both state and non-state) and the concern that any global governmental 
body would inevitably fail to reach consensus on many issues and might 
lack democratic legitimacy. 
Into this fray, the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) has, for 
more than two decades, played an important role in standard-setting and 
technical design of the Internet.313 Given the fact that potentially significant 
values and policy choices can be embedded into the Internet’s technical 
 
 308. For example: 
In the course of the first ten years of production, that is, between 2004 and 2013, income taxes 
will constitute sixteen percent of total revenues to Chad and the rest will come from royalties 
and dividends. The government is given discretion on how to spend the revenues from income 
taxes subject to the limitation that they be used for general development purposes. The 
government has less liberty when it comes to royalties and dividends. A Special Revenue 
Account is created in which they would be deposited. A distribution formula has also been 
specified. Ten percent of the money will be kept in international financial institutions as a 
fund for future generations. Eighty-five percent of the remaining ninety percent will be 
deposited in local commercial banks and is dedicated to the financing of programs in five 
important sectors namely, education, health and social services, rural development, 
infrastructure, and environment and water resources. The remaining fifteen percent would be 
devoted to the development of the oil-producing Doba region. 
Id. at 41–42. 
 309. Id. at 42. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. For a summary of criticisms, see id. at 43–46. 
 313. See INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW OF IETF, available at http://www.ietf.org/ 
overview.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
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architecture,314 the IETF is an important—though by no means the only—
place where Internet governance battles play out. 
Since at least 1992, the IETF has self-consciously sought ways to 
effectively manage its inherently hybrid space as a non-state entity 
embedding standards into a global technology. Its approach has been 
completely non-territorial, relying on the “rough consensus” of volunteer 
network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers who join e-mail lists 
to discuss potential standards and attend triennial meetings held in different 
locations around the world.315 Meetings are open to all, and anyone 
connected to the Internet can join the email mailing lists that discuss 
proposed protocols.316 Moreover, everyone who attends meetings has an 
equal right to participate.317 At least one scholar celebrates the IETF for 
instantiating Jürgen Habermas’s ideal of deliberative democracy.318 On the 
other hand, though the IETF admirably draws from a wide range of 
territorial communities, the participants might be said to hail largely from a 
single elite community of technologists who, for the most part, speak the 
same language and share the same goals.319 Indeed, it may well be these 
shared community norms (and the fact that most Internet standards 
decisions are likely to be non-zero-sum games320) that make “rough 
consensus” even possible.321 Nevertheless, the IETF’s global egalitarian 
ethic at the very least attempts to manage hybridity through broad-based 
participation from members of multiple territorial communities, while 
eschewing both nation-state and top-down international governmental 
approaches. Moreover, it is interesting to consider that this open, relatively 
nonhierarchical, approach to standard-setting in a hybrid environment 
helped to establish the Internet as a wildly successful, global phenomenon 
in the first place.322  
 
 314. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999). 
 315. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 792–94 (2003). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See id. at 797 (“[T]he Internet Standards-making institutions and processes are international 
phenomena that conform relatively well to the discourse required to actualize Habermas’s discourse 
ethics. The participants in the IETF engage in constant discourse, continually reflect on their actions, 
and routinely document their reflections in a self-conscious manner.”). 
 319. See id. 
 320. See id. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. 
L. REV. 822, 828 (2001). 
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G.  MUTUAL RECOGNITION REGIMES 
Given that harmonization is often difficult with regard to the 
substantive norms applied to products or services that cross borders, a more 
pluralist strategy for achieving some level of intersystemic regulation 
involves so-called mutual recognition regimes.323 Under a policy of mutual 
recognition, different communities retain their own standards for internally-
produced products, but agree to recognize another jurisdiction’s standards 
for products imported from that jurisdiction. Thus, material entering, say, 
France from the United States would be subject to U.S. law despite its 
presence in France. Such a regime still leaves space for communities to 
adopt their own norms, but then seeks to manage the hybridity that the 
movement across territorial borders inevitably creates. 
Of course, as the French Yahoo! case discussed previously makes 
clear, communities will not always be willing even to go this far in ceding 
their own regulatory control, particularly if the norms involved are deemed 
fundamental. Not surprisingly then, most mutual recognition regimes set 
conditions on the recognition of foreign laws, regulations, standards, and 
certification procedures in order to ensure that such recognition will be 
“compatible” with local regulation. Making such a determination requires 
consideration of when normative differences are “legitimate” or 
“acceptable” and when they are so different that they cannot be recognized. 
And, as with margins of appreciation or permissible invocation of personal 
law, though the line-drawing problems can be formidable, the basic inquiry 
seeks to bring disparate communities into dialogue with each other and 
pave the way for working cooperation without imposing uniformity. 
Indeed, mutual recognition regimes tend to elide distinctions between 
domestic and international regulation by “intermingling domestic laws in 
order to constitute the global.”324 
In order to see how the line-drawing works, we can consider two 
cases. In one, the European Court of Justice ruled that, under a mutual 
recognition regime, Germany must recognize French standards for 
 
 323. For useful discussions of mutual recognition regimes, see, for example, Kalypso Nicolaidis 
& Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global 
Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2005); Kalypso Nicolaidis, Regulatory Cooperation and 
Managed Mutual Recognition: Elements of a Strategic Model, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 571, 596 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000); 
Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New 
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29 (2002) [hereinafter Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals]. 
 324. See Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 323, at 266. 
BERM13 10/1/2007 10:11:21 AM 
2007] GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 1225 
marketing the liqueur cassis (and therefore cannot ban French imports on 
consumer protection grounds) because Germany could vindicate its 
consumer protection concerns through labeling.325 On the other hand, the 
WTO Appellate Body permitted the United States to ban the importation of 
shrimp caught without devices to protect turtles, as required by U.S. law, in 
part because no other approach would vindicate the U.S. government’s 
global environmental protection concerns.326 Nevertheless, the Appellate 
Body did require the United States to provide foreign governments or 
exporters with an opportunity to comment on U.S. regulatory decisions that 
could affect them.327 Thus, the mutual recognition regime, even when it 
does not force full recognition of the foreign norm, can at least open up 
space for debate about conflicting norms. 
As these two cases indicate, mutual recognition regimes often provide 
for international oversight or adjudication. Alternatively, national courts 
may be forced to consider the degree to which a foreign standard should 
apply to a cross-border transaction, leading to choice-of-law questions of 
the sort considered in Part IV.I below. In addition, transnational networks 
of regulatory officials may work together to negotiate and monitor the day-
to-day operation of such regimes. Finally, private third-party NGOs or 
monitoring firms can also be employed to help police the agreements. 
Another form of mutual recognition scheme involves court-to-court 
recognition of judgments. As discussed in Part IV.I below, within federal 
systems communities generally recognize and enforce each other’s 
judgments, even when the judgment reflects a normative commitment that 
differs from the one in the recognizing community. But what about in 
multi-ethnic states with uncertain or unstable political sovereignty? Here, 
we may see dueling legal systems operating among different ethnic 
populations within the same territorial space, with limited ability for either 
legal system to establish coercive power over the other. 
For example, Elena Baylis has written about the two parallel court 
systems currently operating in Kosovo, one Serbian and the other largely 
Kosovar Albanian and controlled by the United Nations Administration 
Mission in Kosovo.328 Baylis notes that, “[f]or the people of Kosovo, these 
 
 325. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein,  1979 
E.C.R. 649, ¶14,  3 C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979). 
 326. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewer 
window.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.doc. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2007). 
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parallel systems create legal uncertainty and conflict on a basic, day-to-day 
level.”329 Because the systems do not recognize each other’s judgments and 
do not share court files, records of land titles, births, deaths, marriages, or 
divorces, even run-of-the-mill civil matters must be pursued in both courts, 
leading to conflicting judgments, speculation, and arbitrage. Meanwhile 
criminal suspects may face trial in both courts. Moreover, as Baylis 
observes,  
Kosovo’s parallel courts are also an example of the legal 
pluralism that has developed in other divided societies. . . . How, 
for example, should Mexico treat decisions from Zapatista courts? 
What about the judgments of religious authorities in Iraq, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, or France? How can long divided societies like 
the Greek and Turkish administrations in Cyprus incorporate each 
other’s judicial determinations if they are eventually unified?330 
Significantly, while bringing to justice those accused of the worst human 
rights abuses has long been the focus of international law scholars and 
activists, the day-to-day operation of these plural legal systems and their 
resolution of more ordinary, everyday disputes may be just as important to 
the local population and may be an even more crucial element in the 
rebuilding of post-conflict societies. 
Mutual recognition provides a response to this problem of hybridity. 
Obviously, the competing claims to sovereignty in Kosovo are strongly 
contested, so asking the two courts to harmonize norms would be 
impossible. Yet, it is not necessary for courts to agree with each other’s 
substantive norms or even to acknowledge each other’s legitimacy or 
claims to sovereignty in order to recognize each other’s legal judgments, at 
least in the mine run of cases. Indeed, as Baylis argues, such negotiation of 
difference could actually provide a foundation for political compromise on 
the broader question of sovereignty. Accordingly, she proposes the 
application of recognition of judgments principles to the ethnically-based 
legal conflict, regardless of the contested sovereignty claims underlying the 
formal legitimacy of the two courts.331 
Of course, in a land of intense inter-ethnic rivalry and contest, some 
judgments may so reek of ethnic favoritism that enforcing the judgment 
will be anathema. But that is simply another form of the line-drawing 
problems discussed throughout this Article. The crucial points to consider 
 
 329. Id. at 3. 
 330. Id. at 4. 
 331. See id. at 5–8. 
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are first, that many judgments do not implicate fundamental political or 
normative differences and can therefore be enforced easily; and second, 
that the dialogue involved in considering recognition can help bridge gaps 
between communities that can lead to broader political compromises. In 
any event, such recognition regimes are essential in hybrid legal spaces 
simply to solve practical problems people encounter in their day-to-day 
lives. As Baylis notes, “[a]s long as people in Kosovo continue to rely on 
those decisions, past or present, whether those judgments can and should be 
recognized and enforced are legal questions that must be addressed.”332 
Mutual recognition regimes therefore pose one way of moderating the 
effects of political gulfs in hybrid legal spaces. 
H.  SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENTS 
Like mutual recognition regimes, safe harbor agreements can manage 
hybridity by creating an intermediate plane between the conflicting 
normative requirements of two different communities. Instead of full 
harmonization of norms, safe harbor principles require that firms doing 
business abroad abide by some, though not all, of the standards of that 
foreign community.333 In return, the foreign community agrees not to 
impose further regulatory burdens. 
The U.S.-E.C. data privacy initiative is the best-known example of a 
state-to-state safe harbor agreement. The Safe Harbor Principles on data 
privacy subject U.S. businesses to a higher standard of privacy protection 
than they would need to follow domestically. If firms do comply, however, 
then under the agreement, the firms will not be subject to challenge under 
potentially even more stringent EU privacy directives. Significantly, these 
principles create no legal obligations within the United States. “The United 
States and EC may thereby claim that they formally retain autonomy to 
enact whatever privacy legislation that they deem appropriate. Any firm, 
however, that engages in cross-border exchange is subject to pressure to 
abide by the Principles.”334 As such, the Safe Harbor Principles seek to 
retain space for local law while recognizing and facilitating the inevitability 
of cross-community interaction. 
Safe harbors can also function as a way in which formal law 
incorporates less formal or less institutionalized lawmaking processes. For 
example, the “Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits,” 
 
 332. Id. at 4. 
 333. See Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals, supra note 323, at 57–58. 
 334. Id. at 58. 
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adopted widely among industrialized countries, is not officially a binding 
legal document, having been created as a “Gentleman’s Agreement” of 
participants.335 However, adherence to the “Arrangement” now functions as 
a safe harbor for the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.336 Accordingly, through the mechanism of the safe harbor, a 
formal international lawmaking body can enshrine a system of deference to 
a less formal, practice-based industry arrangement. 
I.  A PLURALIST APPROACH TO CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The three classic legal doctrines often grouped together under the 
rubric of conflict of laws—jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment 
recognition—are specifically meant to manage hybrid legal spaces. As 
discussed previously, however, although these doctrines are where one 
would most expect to see creative innovations springing forth to address 
hybridity, they have often been deployed only in the service of 
sovereigntist territorialism and tend to become mired in often fruitless or 
arbitrary inquiries, such as how best to locate activities in physical space in 
order to choose a single nation-state’s law or court system as the sole 
governing authority. Accordingly, by considering these conflicts doctrines, 
we can see what a pluralist framework adds, though for the purposes of this 
Article, I can only gesture to the types of inquiry that would be opened up 
by a more pluralist approach.337 
With regard to jurisdiction, current jurisdictional doctrine tends to be 
grounded in the number of contacts a party has with a territorial location.338 
Such an exclusive focus on territorial location, however, often lends 
jurisdictional disputes an air of unreality. Witness, for example, the bizarre 
claim of the U.S. government that federal courts have no jurisdiction over 
military detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, despite the fact that 
the facility is completely controlled by U.S. military personnel operating at 
 
 335. For a discussion of this Arrangement, see Levit, supra note 27, at 157–67. 
 336. See id. at 165. 
 337. For a more detailed analysis of what a pluralist approach to conflicts doctrines would entail, 
see Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 11; Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision, 
supra note 104. 
 338. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing a test for 
determining whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution based on whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the relevant state “such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” 
(citation omitted)). 
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the behest of the U.S. government.339 And though the United States 
Supreme Court ultimately rejected that extreme claim to “foreignness” 
from U.S. law,340 the Court’s ruling might have been based on the 
particular circumstances of sovereignty over Guantanamo, rather than a 
more general understanding that U.S. court jurisdiction can be asserted 
over U.S. government-run detention facilities, no matter where they are 
located spatially. 
 Indeed, as in the Guantanamo case, territorial location is often 
largely irrelevant to the actual dispute, and yet territory takes on inflated 
significance in jurisdictional inquiries. For example, in France’s efforts to 
prosecute Yahoo! for allowing French citizens to download Nazi 
memorabilia and Holocaust denial material, location was largely a red 
herring. To begin with, no one doubted that the French court could assert 
jurisdiction over Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s French subsidiary; the dispute only 
concerned yahoo.com. But, of course, that distinction, which was based on 
territory, was immaterial to Internet users because anyone wishing to 
access the proscribed materials could just as easily type “yahoo.com” as 
“yahoo.fr” into their browsers, thereby circumventing any restrictions 
placed on yahoo.fr. Thus, the different “locations” of yahoo.fr and 
yahoo.com were, from a practical perspective, completely unimportant. 
Similarly, focusing on minutiae such as the physical location either of 
Yahoo!’s web servers (an arbitrary and easily changeable detail) or of the 
safety deposit box housing the share certificate indicating Yahoo.com’s 
ownership of Yahoo.fr completely sidesteps the core question of whether 
Yahoo! should be deemed within the dominion of France. Thus, a territorial 
analysis tends to preclude any engagement with the fundamental issues 
surrounding how best to negotiate normative differences among multiple 
communities. And, as discussed previously,341 focusing on territorial 
location tends to result in jurisdictional stalemate because either U.S. law 
reaches “into” France extraterritorially, or France’s prosecution reaches 
“into” the United States extraterritorially, with no territorially-based means 
of resolving the conundrum. 
 In contrast, a pluralist conception, because it deemphasizes 
territorial location and recognizes the importance of multiple communities, 
would focus on relevant community affiliation, regardless of territory. Such 
an analysis would suggest piercing the corporate form and analyzing 
 
 339. See Brief for the Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 
2004 WL 425739. 
 340. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 341. See supra text accompanying notes 11–16. 
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Yahoo!’s substantive connections to French customers and the global 
Internet market, which were numerous.342 Thus, the French court’s ultimate 
assertion of jurisdiction can be justified on those grounds (though 
significantly they were not the stated basis of the judgment). But whatever 
the ultimate result, it seems clear that the territorial formalisms with which 
the debate was fought simply cannot provide a rational framework for 
making jurisdictional judgments.  
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that a community-based 
analysis would not necessarily result in broader assertions of jurisdiction 
than under current jurisdictional schemes. For example, if plaintiffs were 
required to have community ties with the forum, forum-shopping would be 
more difficult because plaintiffs could not simply choose the community 
with the most convivial law, regardless of social ties. Likewise, a 
community-based approach might not permit so-called transient-presence 
jurisdiction, where the defendant is present within the physical boundaries 
of a territory only briefly, or for an unrelated reason.343 Such transient-
presence jurisdiction is generally permissible under territorial schemes, 
leading to such ludicrous activities as service of process in an airplane as it 
flies over a territorial jurisdiction.344 By inquiring about substantive ties to 
a community rather than formal contacts with a location, a community-
based approach would render such jurisdictional assertions more amenable 
to challenge. Finally, there might be occasions when a territorially-based 
inquiry would find, say, that a small number of contacts with a jurisdiction 
would be sufficient to render a defendant subject to suit there. A 
community-based approach, however, would go beyond counting contacts 
to inquire about the substantive bonds formed between the member of the 
forum community and the territorially distant actor. 
Turning to choice of law, a pluralist approach asks courts to consider 
the variety of normative communities with possible ties to a particular 
dispute. In doing so, judges must see themselves as part of an interlocking 
network of domestic, transnational, and international norms. Recognizing 
the “complex and interwoven forces that govern citizens’ conduct in a 
 
 342. See Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 104, at 1878; Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS 261, 267 (2002). 
 343. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610–19 (1990) (Scalia, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Kennedy, JJ.) (finding jurisdiction based on mere transient presence 
consonant with traditional practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 344. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (permitting assertion 
of jurisdiction in such circumstances). 
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global society,”345 courts can develop a jurisprudence that reflects this 
hybrid reality.  
Such a jurisprudence looks to a variety of possible legal sources. First, 
courts can take into account the multiple domestic norms of nation-states 
affected by the dispute. In considering which national norms to give 
greatest salience, courts must consider the community affiliations of the 
parties and the effect of various rules on the polities of the affected states. 
Moreover, whereas most traditional choice-of-law regimes require a choice 
of one national norm, a pluralist approach permits judges to develop a 
hybrid rule that may not correspond to any particular national regime. 
Second, international treaties, agreements, or other statements of evolving 
international or transnational norms may provide relevant guidance. Third, 
courts should consider community affiliations that are not associated with 
nation-states, such as industry standards, norms of behavior promulgated 
by nongovernmental organizations, community custom, and rules 
associated with particular activities. Fourth, courts should take into account 
traditional conflicts principles. For example, choice-of-law regimes should 
not develop rules that encourage a regulatory “race to the bottom” by 
making it easy to evade legal regimes. 
In order to see how such a conception might work, consider a Fourth 
Circuit case involving a website with the domain name barcelona.com.346 
In that case, Mr. Joan Nogueras Cobo (“Nogueras”), a Spanish citizen, 
registered barcelona.com with the Virginia-based domain name registrar, 
Network Solutions.347 Subsequently, Nogueras formed a corporation under 
U.S. law, called Bcom, Inc.348 Despite the U.S. incorporation, however, the 
company had no offices, employees, or even a telephone listing in the 
United States.349 Nogueras (and the Bcom servers) remained in Spain.350 
The Barcelona City Council asserted that Nogueras had no right to use 
barcelona.com under Spanish trademark law and demanded that he transfer 
the domain name registration to the City Council.351 The Fourth Circuit, 
though, ruled against the City, applying U.S. trademark law because the 
domain name was registered with an American registrar company.352 
 
 345. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15, at 550. 
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Using a pluralist framework, the analysis would have focused on 
community ties rather than contacts with territory. The jurisdictional 
analysis would therefore have come out the other way because the dispute 
concerned a Spanish individual and a Spanish city fighting over a Spanish 
domain name that itself refers to a Spanish city. The idea that this dispute 
should be adjudicated under U.S. law because of where the domain name 
registry company is or because the Spanish citizen created a dummy 
corporation in the United States fails to capture the reality of the situation. 
A U.S. court taking a pluralist approach, therefore, would need to be 
restrained and not assume that U.S. trademark law should apply 
extraterritorially. 
 Just as with choice of law, a pluralist vision of judgment recognition 
requires judges to see themselves as part of an international network of 
normative communities and the parties before them as potentially affiliated 
with multiple such communities, both state and non-state. Those various 
communities might legitimately seek to impose their norms on such 
affiliated parties. Thus, when faced with an enforcement decision regarding 
a foreign judgment, courts should not necessarily assume that their own 
local public policies trump the dictates of the foreign judgment. Instead, 
courts must undertake a nuanced inquiry concerning whether the 
affiliations of the parties render the original judgment legitimate. Although 
the local policies of the forum country are not irrelevant, those policies 
should be weighed against the overall interest in creating an interlocking 
system of international adjudication. 
This is not so different from what U.S. courts already do in domestic 
cases raising judgment recognition issues. Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has long held that states cannot refuse to enforce sister-state 
judgments on the ground that doing so would violate the rendering state’s 
public policy.353 This is even true when the judgment being enforced would 
be illegal if issued by the rendering state.354 Thus, recognizing a judgment 
is a hybrid position because it allows communities to maintain different 
norms while creating a space for cooperation. 
Of course, the decision to enforce a judgment surely will be less 
automatic when the judgment at issue was rendered by a foreign court or 
non-state community. Nevertheless, many of the same principles still are 
relevant. Most importantly, the “conflicts values” that underlie the Full 
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Faith and Credit command should be part of the judgment recognition 
calculus. Thus, courts should acknowledge the importance of participating 
in an interlocking international legal system, where litigants cannot simply 
avoid unpleasant judgments by relocating. As in the choice-of-law context, 
deference to other normative communities will have long-term reciprocal 
benefits and will contribute to a more tolerant, jurisgenerative world order. 
And, particularly when the parties have no significant affiliation with the 
forum state, there is little reason for a court to insist on following domestic 
public policies in the face of such competing conflicts values. 
For example, consider Telnikoff v. Matusevitch,355 a case decided by 
the Maryland Court of Appeals. This was a libel action between two British 
citizens concerning writings that appeared in a British newspaper.356 After 
a complicated sequence of proceedings in the United Kingdom, a jury ruled 
for the plaintiff and ordered damages. Matusevitch, however, moved to 
Maryland and subsequently sought a declaratory order that the British libel 
judgment could not be enforced in the United States, pursuant to the First 
Amendment.357 The Maryland court ultimately ruled that, because British 
libel law violates the speech-protective First Amendment standards laid out 
by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan358 and 
its progeny, the British judgment violated Maryland public policy and 
could not be enforced.359 
But there is no reason to think the U.S. Constitution is necessarily 
implicated in an enforcement action. First, it is debatable whether the 
simple enforcement of a judgment creates the requisite state action to 
generate constitutional concerns.360 Second, with regard to interstate 
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harmony, a refusal to enforce the British libel judgment effectively imposes 
U.S. First Amendment norms on the UK. Such parochialism in judgment 
recognition, as in choice of law, is cause for concern. Third, while it is true 
that constitutional norms could conceivably create sufficient public policy 
reasons to refuse to enforce a judgment, the libel dispute in Telnikoff did 
not in any way implicate U.S. public policy because neither party had any 
particular affiliation with the United States at the time of the events at 
issue. 
Thus, even if U.S. constitutional values or public policy 
considerations might sometimes require a court to refuse to enforce a 
judgment, there is no basis for a categorical rule preventing enforcement, 
and little reason to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment absent significant 
ties between the dispute and the United States. Instead, courts should take 
seriously the conflicts values that would be effectuated by enforcing the 
foreign judgment, weigh the importance of such values against the relative 
importance of the local public policy or constitutional norm, and consider 
the degree to which the parties have affiliated themselves with the forum. 
Only then can courts take into account the multistate nature of the dispute 
and the flexible quality of community affiliation in a multivariate world. 
**** 
Even this necessarily brief survey of different mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices for managing hybridity leads to several important 
insights. First, the range of interactions discussed above makes it clear that 
hybrid legal spaces are the norm rather than the exception, and as a 
practical matter we may not be able to wish them away. Second, we should 
view the various procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
surveyed as important sites for managing hybridity, not just as necessary 
but regrettable compromises. Indeed, such pluralist approaches may, at 
 
their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might 
later seek the security of potential judicial enforcement”). Although generations of legal realists and 
critical legal studies scholars have articulated similarly sweeping conceptions of state action, see Paul 
Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional 
Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1279–81 (2000) (surveying these critiques), 
courts have largely resisted Shelley and have limited its holding only to the context of racially 
restrictive covenants. Indeed, even in cases implicating the First Amendment, “with virtually no 
exceptions, courts have concluded that the judicial enforcement of private agreements inhibiting speech 
does not trigger constitutional review, despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on speech 
would have.” Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L. J. 171, 192–95 (2004) 
(collecting cases). Thus, it is not clear how robust Shelley still is and whether it would truly pose a 
constitutional bar in an action to enforce a foreign judgment. For further discussion of Shelley and its 
implications for judgment recognition, see Rosen, supra at 186–209. 
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least on some occasions, actually be preferable. Third, when evaluating the 
efficacy of any particular procedural mechanism, we should, in addition to 
any other criteria that might be considered, take into account how well the 
mechanism provides space for hybridity and jurisgenerative iterations, and 
mediates among multiple communities. In other words, the management of 
hybridity should be seen as an independent value. Fourth, this survey 
provides a useful menu of options for communities attempting to negotiate 
hybridity. Indeed, many of the mechanisms and institutions considered here 
could usefully be adopted by state or non-state communities. Alternatively, 
new mechanisms could be created along similar lines. Finally, identifying 
these mechanisms as sites for contestation establishes a research agenda 
whereby the micro-interactions inherent in each mechanism can be detailed 
and studied to see how precisely these mechanisms operate in practice. 
Only this sort of detailed case study will allow us to understand the ways in 
which such mechanisms can function as sites of contestation and creative 
innovation. In short, the pluralist framework I propose here illuminates an 
entire field of inquiry and asks scholars to consider the processes whereby 
normative gaps among communities can be bridged, shared social spaces 
can be created, and enemies can be transformed into adversaries, all 
without displacing contestation or dissolving difference. This is a difficult 
task to be sure, but there can be no hope of meeting the challenge without 
first conceptualizing the independent value of pluralism. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset, a pluralist approach to mechanisms, 
institutions, and practices for managing hybridity is unlikely to fully satisfy 
anyone. Human rights advocates will prefer a stronger emphasis on 
universal norms. Those craving certainty in business transactions will 
prefer more focus on transnational and international harmonization. Those 
troubled that international agreements may override local environmental, 
labor, and consumer protection standards will resist giving any play to non-
local norms. And sovereigntists concerned about the primacy of the 
territorially-based nation-state will reject giving non-state norms a place at 
the table. Finally, some will see in my invocation of pluralism either an 
undue romanticization of local communities despite the fact that such 
communities can sometimes be profoundly illiberal and repressive, or an 
undue romanticization of the international, which likewise can sometimes 
be profoundly illiberal and repressive. 
My answer, I suppose, is that hybridity is messy, but it is the 
necessary condition of a deterritorialized world where multiple overlapping 
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communities seek to apply their norms to a single act or actor. In such a 
world, universal harmonization is unlikely to be fully achievable even if it 
were normatively desirable. Likewise, insisting on local or state 
prerogatives against all incursions is impractical and takes no account of 
multiple community affiliations apart from the state. Hybridity is therefore 
a reality, and it is the task of international legal scholars to develop, 
evaluate, and improve the mechanisms, institutions, and practices for 
managing such hybridity. Doing so emphatically does not commit one to 
embracing the norms of all normative communities in all circumstances. 
Indeed, each of us has political and normative commitments of our own, 
which will cash out differently depending on context. 
The messiness of hybridity also means that it is impossible to provide 
answers ex ante regarding occasions when pluralism should be honored and 
occasions when it should be trumped. As noted throughout, such line-
drawing questions can be exceedingly difficult, and every person or 
community will draw the line a bit differently depending on political 
interests and normative commitments. Moreover, any answer is inevitably 
both “local” and transient, because it will immediately be contested by 
other communities. Indeed, part of the reality of pluralism is that no answer 
is ever final or followed by all. In any event, a detailed analysis of the line-
drawing problems encountered in each individual context probably could 
fruitfully be addressed in a series of separate articles. 
Here, my hope is only to orient thinking about all of these problems in 
terms of managing hybridity and to provide a set of examples in order to 
suggest the degree to which a wide variety of transnational and 
international regulatory problems can be conceptualized in this way. In 
addition, the processes, institutions, and practices surveyed provide a menu 
of options for communities seeking to manage hybrid legal spaces in the 
future. The advantage of this pluralist approach is that, rather than seeking 
ways to quickly solve problems of hybrid legal spaces by, for example, 
arbitrarily localizing a transaction and then applying a territorially-based 
norm, we will ask ourselves about other possible norm-generating 
communities that might have an interest in the question at issue and seek 
ways of effectuating various competing norms if possible. Moreover, when 
such accommodation is not possible, we will at least articulate the reasons 
why. Finally, in many instances the very existence of jurisdictional overlap 
and redundancy will create multiple points of entry and therefore also 
provide the possibility of forging alternatives through an iterative and 
jurisgenerative process of dialectical interaction. 
In the end, pluralist processes, institutions, and practices for managing 
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hybridity may at least sometimes be preferable because they can instantiate 
a social space in which enemies can be turned into adversaries. Of course, 
some may not seek shared social space and may instead wish simply to 
annihilate those with whom they differ. If enough people feel that way, war 
is the likely result, and the analysis here has little to say about communities 
that are in the midst of war. But, for those willing to countenance the idea 
that multiple communities have norms that at the very least deserve a 
respectful hearing, mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing 
hybridity hold out the possibility of forging provisional compromises. 
Moreover, by seeking to manage hybridity rather than eliminate it, we are 
more likely to preserve spaces for contestation, creative adaptation, and 
innovation, and to inculcate ideals of tolerance, dialogue, and mutual 
accommodation in our adjudicatory and regulatory institutions. As 
international law scholars address the reality of global legal pluralism, 
preserving such hybrid spaces and inculcating such tolerant ideals may 
often be the best that law can do to create the possibility of peaceful co-
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